S. 1977 (110^th): Nuclear Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 2007

Sustained global leadership by the United States will remain essential in a cooperative global effort to prevent nuclear terrorism, reduce global nuclear arsenals, stop the spread of nuclear weapons and related material and technology, and support the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear technology.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission) concluded that a trained nuclear engineer with an amount of highly enriched uranium or plutonium about the size of a grapefruit or an orange, together with commercially available material, could fashion a nuclear device that would fit in a van like the one Ramzi Yousef parked in the garage of the World Trade Center in 1993. Such a bomb would level Lower Manhattan.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed 16 incidents between 1993 and 2005 that involved trafficking in relatively small quantities of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

United States cooperative threat reduction programs have made significant progress in securing, monitoring, and reducing nuclear stockpiles, but there are still significant quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material that remain vulnerable to theft or diversion.

There are an estimated 60 tons of highly enriched uranium, enough to make over 1,000 nuclear bombs, that are located at facilities associated with civilian industries spread among over 40 countries around the world, and physical security standards governing such materials vary, creating vulnerabilities to theft or diversion.

Securing nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material at their source is the most direct and reliable way to disrupt efforts by terrorist organizations to acquire such material. Interdiction and other measures based on international cooperation and collaboration must also be sustained.

The dangers posed by the spread of nuclear weapons-related technology and the need to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime are highlighted by—

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty permits countries to acquire a capability to produce fissile material for civilian purposes that brings them to the brink of a capability to produce weapons-usable nuclear material without necessarily violating the agreement, giving them the ability to then leave without penalty unless the United Nations Security Council or other countries take meaningful action.

The threat of nuclear weapons to the United States and the rest of the world cannot be reduced without stronger international cooperation to achieve universal compliance with tighter nuclear nonproliferation rules and standards as part of a comprehensive and balanced nonproliferation strategy that recognizes legitimate, peaceful nuclear uses.

To bolster international support for nuclear nonproliferation and reduce the saliency of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons states should reaffirm their commitment to Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and all states, particularly nuclear weapons states, should actively reaffirm their commitment to Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and tangibly support the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear technology.

The Cold War rivalry that led to the stockpiling of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons ended more than 15 years ago, but the nuclear weapons doctrines of the United States and the Russian Federation have changed very little and large arsenals of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons remain in each country.

slowing and eventually halting the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies to enrich uranium or separate plutonium;

establishing multilayered, multilateral nuclear fuel supply assurances, including an international nuclear fuel bank, consistent with United States nonproliferation objectives to dissuade countries from building their own uranium enrichment capability;

strengthening the inspection and nuclear safety capabilities and authority of the IAEA and reaffirming support for appropriate measures to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

taking steps to ensure that all countries adopt the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, which grants the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and nuclear-related sites;

reaffirming the commitment of the United States to fulfill its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and encouraging other nuclear weapon states to reaffirm their commitments to fulfill obligations under the Treaty, including by taking steps to achieve deeper, verifiable reductions in global nuclear arsenals and their means of delivery;

initiating talks with the Government of the Russian Federation to reduce the number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and further reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons in the respective nuclear stockpiles of the United States and the Russian Federation in a transparent and verifiable fashion and in a manner consistent with the security of the United States;

taking measures to reduce the risk of an accidental, unauthorized, or mistaken launch of nuclear weapons, including by considering changes in the alert status in United States and Russian forces and rapidly completing the Joint Data Exchange Center, which would improve communications and transparency between the United States and the Russian Federation;

continuing the United States moratorium on nuclear test explosions, initiating a bipartisan process to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, working to secure ratification by other key countries, and fully supporting United States commitments to fund the international monitoring system to help detect and deter possible nuclear explosions by other countries;

pursuing and concluding an agreement to verifiably halt the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons;

strengthening Nuclear Suppliers Group export control guidelines, national border and transhipment controls, and intelligence and law enforcement efforts to investigate and block the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technologies in order to prevent future black-market nuclear networks like the A.Q. Khan network;

strengthening the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) through appropriate measures;

fully implementing the Lugar-Obama initiative (sections 10, 11, and 12 of the State Department Authorities Act of 2006 (Public Law 109–472; 22 U.S.C. 2349bb–5, 22 U.S.C. 2349bb–6, and 22 U.S.C. 2751 note), which strengthens the ability of foreign countries friendly to the United States to detect and interdict weapons of mass destruction and related material;

achieving increased and sustained financial and other support from Russia, the European Union and its member states, China, Japan, and other countries for stronger, standardized, and worldwide physical security for nuclear weapons and material as well as for other global nuclear nonproliferation efforts;

accelerating United States programs to secure, consolidate, and reduce global stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material and ensuring that the highest priority is placed on the security for those stockpiles that pose the greatest risk; and

taking steps to delegitimize and eventually eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian commerce.