S. 1097 (112th): New START Treaty Implementation Act

112th Congress, 2011–2013. Text as of May 26, 2011 (Introduced).

Status & Summary | PDF | Source: GPO

II

112th CONGRESS

1st Session

S. 1097

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

May 26, 2011

(for himself, Mr. Sessions, Mr. McCain, Mr. Cornyn, Mr. Wicker, Mr. Vitter, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Corker, and Mr. Portman) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To strengthen the strategic force posture of the United States by implementing and supplementing certain provisions of the New START Treaty and the Resolution of Ratification, and for other purposes.

1.

Short title; table of contents

(a)

Short title

This Act may be cited as the New START Treaty Implementation Act.

(b)

Table of contents

The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

Sec. 3. Use of funds on the modernization of nuclear weapons.

Sec. 4. Limitation on nuclear force reductions.

Sec. 5. Nuclear employment strategy.

Sec. 6. Force analysis and assessment of the capabilities of the nuclear forces of the United States.

Sec. 7. Annual assessment and report on the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and control system.

Sec. 8. Missile defense.

Sec. 9. Annual report on the plan for the modernization of the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery platforms.

Sec. 10. Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility and Uranium Processing Facility.

Sec. 11. Policy on non-nuclear weapons systems.

Sec. 12. Non-strategic nuclear weapon reductions and extended deterrence policy.

2.

Definitions

In this Act:

(1)

The term congressional defense committees has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.

(2)

The term covered nuclear systems means the following:

(A)

B–52H or B–2 bomber aircraft and nuclear air-launched cruise missiles.

(B)

Trident ballistic missile submarines, launch tubes, and Trident D–5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

(C)

Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles and associated silos.

(D)

Nuclear warheads or gravity bombs that can be delivered by the systems specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).

(E)

Nuclear weapons delivered by means other than the systems specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).

(3)

The term New START Treaty means the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Prague April 8, 2010, with Protocol, including Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol, Annex on Notifications to the Protocol, and Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol (Treaty Document 111–5).

3.

Use of funds on the modernization of nuclear weapons

(a)

Findings

Congress finds the following:

(1)

The President of the United States, in a letter dated December 18, 2010, declared, I recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment for the long-term, in addition to this one-year budget increase. That is my commitment to the Congress that my Administration will pursue these programs and capabilities for as long as I am President. In future years, we will provide annual updates to the [report required under section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549)]..

(2)

Article 5, Section 1 of the New START Treaty declares, Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out..

(3)

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates declared on October 28, 2008, To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program..

(4)

The November 2010 update to the report required under section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) stated, Notably, stockpile requirements to fully implement the [Nuclear Posture Review] and the New START Treaty have been refined. … Based on this additional work, and the development of new information and insights, the President is prepared to seek additional resources for the Weapons Activities account, over and above the FY 2011 FYNSP, for the FY 2012 budget and for the remainder of the FYNSP period (FY 2013 to FY 2016). Specifically, the President plans to request $7.6 billion for FY 2012 (an increase of $0.6 billion over the planned FY 2012 funding level …). Given the extremely tight budget environment facing the Federal Government, these requests to the Congress demonstrate the priority the [Administration] places on maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the deterrent..

(5)

The Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan for Fiscal Year 2011, dated May 2010, stated, The Laboratory Directors will be expected to provide findings associated with the full range of [life extension program] approaches, and to make a set of recommendations based solely on their best technical assessments of the ability of each [life extension program] approach to meet critical stockpile management goals (weapons system safety, security, and effectiveness)..

(6)

Section 4204 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2524) (as amended by section 3113 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2704)) established a stockpile management program to provide for the effective management of the weapons in the nuclear weapons stockpile.

(7)

The objectives of the stockpile management program are, first and foremost, to increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States, as well as to further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing, to achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile, and to reduce the risk of an accidental detonation of an element of the stockpile.

(b)

Sense of Congress on life extension program deadlines

(1)

In general

It is the sense of Congress that the life extension program deadlines described in paragraph (2) represent important deadlines that must be met to sustain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile and credible deterrent.

(2)

Deadlines described

The life extension program deadlines described in this paragraph are the deadlines identified in the November 2010 update to the report required under section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) as follows:

(A)

Completion of the W76 build in fiscal year 2018.

(B)

Completion of the first production unit of the B–61 in fiscal year 2017.

(C)

Beginning of the study of life extension options for the W78 in fiscal year 2012.

(D)

Beginning of the study of a common warhead for the W78 and the W88 in fiscal year 2012.

(E)

Beginning of the development of an Arming, Fuzing, and Firing system for the W88 in fiscal year 2012.

(3)

Sense of Congress on stockpile management program

It is the sense of Congress that—

(A)

the primary objective of the stockpile management program to increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States, as specified in section 4204(a) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2524(a)), is of great importance;

(B)

all mechanisms authorized by section 4204 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act for the stockpile management program should be used to find the best means to increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile; and

(C)

section 4204 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act does not give preference to any one mechanism for increasing the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile over any other such mechanism.

(c)

Policy

It is the policy of the United States—

(1)

to accomplish the modernization and replacement of the nuclear triad;

(2)

to sustain a robust stockpile stewardship program and to maintain and modernize the nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities that will both—

(A)

ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the nuclear weapons of the United States at the New START Treaty levels;

(B)

meet requirements for hedging against possible international developments or technical problems, in conformance with the policies of the United States and in support of nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense; and

(C)

section 4204 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act does not give preference to any one mechanism for increasing the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile over any other such mechanism;

(3)

to maintain the nuclear weapons laboratories of the United States and preserve the core nuclear weapons competencies of such laboratories;

(4)

that the President should not take any action to retire or dismantle (or to prepare to retire or dismantle) any of the covered nuclear systems unless modernization or replacement is occurring as proposed in the plans under the report required by section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549), the November 2010 update to such report, and the reports required under section 495 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 9; and

(5)

that if the modernization plan is not funded consistent with the annual report required under such section 495, such failure would jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States and is potential grounds for the withdrawal of the United States from the New START Treaty in accordance with Article XIV of such Treaty.

(d)

Authorization of appropriations

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Energy for fiscal year 2012 for the activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration in carrying out programs necessary for national security in the amount of $11,782,930,000, of which $7,629,716,000 shall be for weapons activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

4.

Limitation on nuclear force reductions

(a)

Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1)

As of September 30, 2009, the stockpile of nuclear weapons of the United States had been reduced by 84 percent from its maximum level in 1967 and by more than 75 percent from its level when the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989.

(2)

The number of non-strategic nuclear weapons of the United States had declined by approximately 90 percent from September 30, 1991, to September 30, 2009.

(3)

On March 29, 2011, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Thomas Donilon stated, As we implement New START, we're making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions. Under the President's direction, the Department of Defense will review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile, which stands at approximately 5,000 warheads, including both deployed and reserve warheads. To develop these options for further reductions, we need to consider several factors, such as potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures that are required for effective deterrence..

(b)

Implementation of New START Treaty

(1)

Limitation

(A)

Except as provided by paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy may not obligate or expend amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy for any of fiscal years 2011 through 2017 to retire any covered nuclear system of the United States as required by the New START Treaty.

(B)

Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall be construed to limit any action (including verification) required by the New START Treaty other than retiring any covered nuclear system of the United States.

(2)

Waiver

The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy may jointly waive the limitation under paragraph (1)(A) for a covered nuclear system if—

(A)

the Secretaries submit to the congressional defense committees written notice of the status of carrying out the modernization plan described in the most recent report required by section 495 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 9; and

(B)

with respect to such notice—

(i)

if the notice describes that such plan is being carried out, a period of 30 days has elapsed following the date on which the President submits to the congressional defense committees such report that includes written notice of the proposed retirement of such nuclear system, as required by subsection (a)(1)(D) of such section 495; or

(ii)

if the notice describes that such plan is not being carried out, a period of 180 days has elapsed following the date on which the President submits to the congressional defense committees the report described in clause (i).

(3)

Retire defined

In this subsection, the term retire, with respect to a covered nuclear system, includes retiring, dismantling, eliminating or preparing to retire, dismantle, or eliminate.

(c)

Prohibition on reduction of stockpile hedge

(1)

In general

Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy may not obligate or expend amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy to retire, dismantle, or eliminate, or prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate, any nondeployed strategic or non-strategic nuclear weapon until the date that is 90 days after the date on which the Secretary of Energy submits to the congressional defense committees written certification that—

(A)

the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility (in this subsection referred to as the nuclear facility) and the Uranium Processing Facility (in this subsection referred to as the processing facility) are fully operational;

(B)

the nuclear facility and the Plutonium Facility–4 are together able to deliver to the nuclear weapons stockpile not less than a total of 80 pits per year; and

(C)

the processing facility is able to deliver to the nuclear weapons stockpile not less than 80 refurbished or new canned subassemblies per year.

(2)

Exception

The prohibition under paragraph (1) does not apply to activities related to surveillance of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

(d)

Prohibition on unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons

(1)

In general

Part I of subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new chapter:

24

Nuclear posture and missile defense

Sec.

491. Prohibition on unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons.

491.

Prohibition on unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons

The President may not retire, dismantle, or eliminate, or prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate, any nuclear weapon of the United States (including such deployed weapons and nondeployed weapons and warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile) if such action would reduce the number of such weapons to a number that is less than the level described in the New START Treaty (as defined in section 494(c)) unless such action is required by a treaty or international agreement specifically approved with the advice and consent of the Senate pursuant to Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution.

.

(2)

Clerical amendments

The table of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, and at the beginning of part I of such subtitle, are each amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 23 the following new item:

24. Nuclear posture and missile defense491

.

5.

Nuclear employment strategy

(a)

Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1)

Section 1057 of H.R. 5136, as passed by the House of Representatives during the 111th Congress, included a requirement that any future reductions of the nuclear forces of the United States below the level described in the New START Treaty be contingent on the certification by the Secretary of Defense that such reduction does not require a change in targeting strategy from counterforce targeting to countervalue targeting.

(2)

On March 29, 2011, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Thomas Donilon stated, As we implement New START, we're making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions. Under the President's direction, the Department of Defense will review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile, which stands at approximately 5,000 warheads, including both deployed and reserve warheads. To develop these options for further reductions, we need to consider several factors, such as potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures that are required for effective deterrence..

(b)

Changes to strategy

Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 4, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

492.

Nuclear employment strategy

The President may not make any changes to the nuclear employment strategy of the United States unless—

(1)

the President submits to the congressional defense committees a report on such proposed changes, including—

(A)

the implication of such changes on the flexibility and resilience of the strategic forces of the United States and the ability of such forces to support the goals of the United States with respect to nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurances for allies, dissuasion of potential peer competitors, and defense; and

(B)

certification that such proposed changes do not require a change in targeting strategy from counterforce targeting to countervalue targeting, nor do they result in the United States abandoning its second-to-none nuclear forces strategy; and

(2)

a period of 90 days has elapsed after the date on which such report under paragraph (1) is submitted.

.

(c)

Clerical amendment

The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 491 the following new item:

492. Nuclear employment strategy.

.

6.

Force analysis and assessment of the capabilities of the nuclear forces of the United States

(a)

In general

Not later than March 1, 2012, the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a force analysis and net assessment of the current and proposed nuclear forces of the United States to determine whether such forces are capable of meeting the nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense objectives of the United States in the context of the current and anticipated nuclear and non-nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and other countries.

(b)

Elements

The force analysis and net assessment under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1)

Specific metrics to define and measure the strategic sufficiency of the nuclear forces of the United States and the sufficiency of forces necessary to meet the nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense requirements of the United States.

(2)

An identification and assessment of the nuclear strategies of the United States, and the role of nuclear weapons in those strategies, as of the date of the force analysis and net assessment, including—

(A)

how the United States is prepared to limit damage to the United States and its allies if deterrence fails; and

(B)

if the United States requires such capabilities, an assessment of such capabilities.

(3)

An identification of the nuclear force posture of the United States required to fulfill the nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense strategies of the United States, including the planning assumptions on which such posture is based.

(4)

Force-on-force exchange modeling analyses to determine the vulnerability, survivability, and effectiveness of current and proposed nuclear capabilities of the United States in various scenarios (including a surprise attack and an electromagnetic pulse attack by potential adversaries, including Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, or terrorists armed with nuclear weapons) and taking into account various nuclear postures (including day-to-day alert and generated alert).

(5)

An assessment of the implications of disparities between the strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons of the United States and the strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons of other countries with respect to deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense.

(6)

An assessment of the implications that various force levels of the nuclear forces of the United States have on nuclear proliferation, and the effect that such lower force levels have on the motivation or inclination of other countries to increase their nuclear capabilities, and the contingency plans of the United States to respond to such an increase.

(7)

An assessment of the effect of the conventional prompt global strike capabilities of the United States and other countries on the ability of the United States to meet its deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense requirements.

(8)

An assessment of the effect of the ballistic missile defense capabilities of the United States and other countries on the strategic balance and on the nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense strategies of the United States.

(9)

An assessment of the flexibility and resilience of the nuclear forces of the United States, including the potential to upload nondeployed warheads and to modify weapons and warheads to meet unexpected challenges.

(10)

Such other matters as the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate regarding the capabilities of the nuclear forces of the United States.

(c)

Participation of other departments and agencies

In conducting the force analysis and net assessment under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall provide for the appropriate participation of the following:

(1)

The Director of National Intelligence.

(2)

The Joint Staff.

(3)

The Missile Defense Agency.

(4)

The United States Strategic Command.

(5)

Such other elements or components of the Department of Defense as the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(6)

Such other departments and agencies of the Federal Government as the Secretary of Defense and the heads of such departments and agencies jointly consider appropriate.

(7)

The national security laboratories (as defined in section 3281 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2471)).

(d)

Report

(1)

Report required

Not later than September 1, 2012, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the force analysis and net assessment.

(2)

Form

The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form (including as much detail as possible), but may include a classified annex.

(e)

Independent review

(1)

Review

The Secretary of Defense shall provide for the review by one or more federally funded research and development centers of the force analysis and net assessment conducted under subsection (a).

(2)

Participants

The review under paragraph (1) shall also include the participation of the following:

(A)

Such additional individuals as the Secretary considers appropriate with expertise in matters relating to—

(i)

force analysis and net assessment; and

(ii)

the relationship between the force posture of the United States and the nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense goals of the United States.

(B)

A separate individual (who may be a member of Congress) appointed by each of the following:

(i)

The Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(ii)

The Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(iii)

The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(iv)

The Ranking Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(v)

The majority leader of the Senate.

(vi)

The minority leader of the Senate.

(vii)

The Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(viii)

The Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(ix)

The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(x)

The Ranking Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(xi)

The Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(xii)

The minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(3)

Report

Not later than 90 days after the date of the submittal to Congress of the report under subsection (d)(1), the federally funded research and development center conducting a review under paragraph (1) shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the results of the review.

(f)

Appropriate committees of congress defined

In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—

(1)

the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2)

the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

7.

Annual assessment and report on the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and control system

(a)

In general

Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 4, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:

493.

Annual assessment and report on the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and control system

(a)

Annual assessments

(1)

Each covered official shall annually assess the safety, security, reliability, sustainability, performance, and military effectiveness of the systems described in paragraph (2) for which such official has responsibility.

(2)

The systems described in this paragraph are the following:

(A)

Each type of delivery platform for nuclear weapons.

(B)

The nuclear command and control system.

(b)

Annual report

(1)

Not later than December 1 of each year, beginning in 2011, each covered official shall submit to the Secretary of Defense and the Nuclear Weapons Council established by section 179 of this title a report on the assessments conducted under subsection (a).

(2)

Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A)

The results of the assessment.

(B)

An identification and discussion of any capability gaps or shortfalls with respect to the systems described in subsection (a)(2) covered under the assessment.

(C)

An identification and discussion of any risks with respect to meeting mission or capability requirements.

(D)

In the case of an assessment by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command, if the Commander identifies any deficiency with respect to a nuclear weapons delivery platform covered under the assessment, a discussion of the relative merits of any other nuclear weapons delivery platform type or compensatory measure that would accomplish the mission of such nuclear weapons delivery platform.

(E)

An identification and discussion of any matter having an adverse effect on the capability of the covered official to accurately determine the matters covered by the assessment.

(c)

Report to President and Congress

(1)

Not later than March 1 of each year, beginning in 2012, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the President a report containing—

(A)

each report under subsection (b) submitted during the previous year, as originally submitted to the Secretary;

(B)

any comments that the Secretary considers appropriate with respect to each such report;

(C)

any conclusions that the Secretary considers appropriate with respect to the safety, security, reliability, sustainability, performance, or military effectiveness of the systems described in subsection (a)(2); and

(D)

any other information that the Secretary considers appropriate.

(2)

Not later than March 15 of each year, beginning in 2012, the President shall transmit to the congressional defense committees the report submitted to the President under paragraph (1), including any comments the President considers appropriate.

(3)

Each report under this subsection may be in classified form if the Secretary of Defense determines it necessary.

(d)

Covered official defined

In this section, the term covered official means—

(1)

the Commander of the United States Strategic Command;

(2)

the Director of the Strategic Systems Program of the Navy; and

(3)

the Commander of the Global Strike Command of the Air Force.

.

(b)

Clerical amendment

The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 492 the following new item:

493. Annual assessment and report on the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and control system.

.

8.

Missile defense

(a)

Findings

Congress finds that the President, in a letter dated December 18, 2010, pledged the following:

(1)

The New START Treaty places no limitations on the development or deployment of our missile defense programs..

(2)

Starting in 2011, we will begin deploying the first phase of the [European phased, adaptive approach to missile defense], to protect large parts of southern Europe from short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats. In subsequent phases, we will deploy longer-range and more effective land-based standard missile-3 interceptors in Romania and Poland to protect Europe against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In the final phase, planed for the end of the decade, further upgrades of the SM–3 interceptor will provide an ascent-phase intercept capability to augment our defense of NATO European territory, as well as that of the United States, against future threats of ICBMs launched from Iran..

(3)

Regardless of Russia’s actions in this regard, as long as I am President, and as long as the Congress provides the necessary funding, the United States will continue to develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. My Administration plans to deploy all four phases of the [European phased, adaptive approach to missile defense]..

(b)

Policy

It is the policy of the United States—

(1)

that defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense strategies;

(2)

that any further limitations on the missile defense capabilities of the United States are not in the national security interests of the United States;

(3)

that policies based on mutual assured destruction or intentional vulnerability to strategic attack can be contrary to the safety and security of both the United States and the Russian Federation, and both countries share a common interest in defensive capabilities that help both to move cooperatively as soon as possible away from a strategic relationship based on mutual vulnerability;

(4)

that the United States will welcome steps by Russia to also adopt a fundamentally defensive strategic posture that no longer views robust strategic defensive capabilities as undermining the overall strategic balance;

(5)

to improve the strategic defensive capabilities of the United States both quantitatively and qualitatively during the period that the New START treaty is in effect, and such improvements are consistent with the Treaty;

(6)

that no future agreement with Russia on cooperative missile defense, non-strategic nuclear weapons, further strategic weapons reductions, or any other matter shall include any restrictions on the missile defense options of the United States in Europe or elsewhere; and

(7)

to defend the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from all missile threats, including from short-range ballistic missiles.

(c)

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that, given congressional concern about missile defense issues, the President should offer both Houses of Congress regular briefings, not less than twice each year, to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services of the House, on all missile defense issues related to the New START Treaty and on the progress of United States-Russia dialogue and cooperation regarding missile defense.

(d)

Limitations on missile defense

(1)

In general

Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 4, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:

494.

Certain limitations on missile defense

(a)

In general

Any agreement with a country or international organization or amendment to the New START Treaty (including an agreement made by the Bilateral Consultative Commission established by the New START Treaty) concerning the missile defense capabilities of the United States shall not be binding on the United States, and shall not enter into force with respect to the United States, unless after the date of the enactment of this section, such agreement or amendment is specifically approved with the advice and consent of the Senate pursuant to Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution.

(b)

Annual notification

Not later than January 31 of each year, beginning in 2012, the President shall submit to the congressional defense committees a notification of—

(1)

whether the Russian Federation has recognized during the previous year the sovereign right of the United States to pursue quantitative and qualitative improvements in missile defense capabilities; and

(2)

whether during any treaty negotiations or other Government-to-Government contacts between the United States and the Russian Federation (including under the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative Commission established by the New START Treaty) during the previous year a representative of the Russian Federation suggested that a treaty or other international agreement include, with respect to the United States—

(A)

restricting missile defense capabilities, military capabilities in space, or conventional prompt global strike capabilities; or

(B)

reducing the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.

(c)

New START Treaty defined

The term New START Treaty means the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Prague April 8, 2010, with Protocol, including Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol, Annex on Notifications to the Protocol, and Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol (Treaty Document 111–5).

.

(2)

Clerical amendment

The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 493 the following new item:

494. Certain limitations on missile defense.

.

(e)

Restriction of funds for certain treaty negotiations

(1)

Restriction

No funds available to the Department of State or any other Federal department or agency may be obligated or expended during fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for travel expenses related to treaty negotiations concerning the possible reduction of covered nuclear systems of the United States until the date on which the certification under paragraph (2) is transmitted to Congress.

(2)

Certification

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress written notification that negotiations described in paragraph (1) will not include restricting the missile defense capabilities of the United States.

9.

Annual report on the plan for the modernization of the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery platforms

(a)

Annual report

Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 4, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:

495.

Annual report on the plan for the modernization of the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery platforms

(a)

Report on the plan for the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery platforms

(1)

Together with the budget of the President submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the President, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall transmit to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a detailed report on the plan to—

(A)

enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States;

(B)

modernize the nuclear weapons complex;

(C)

maintain, modernize, or replace the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons; and

(D)

retire, dismantle, or eliminate any covered nuclear system.

(2)

Each report required under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A)

A detailed description of the plan to enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States.

(B)

A detailed description of the plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, including improving the safety of facilities, modernizing the infrastructure, and maintaining the key capabilities and competencies of the nuclear weapons workforce, including designers and technicians.

(C)

A detailed description of the plan to maintain, modernize, and replace delivery platforms for nuclear weapons.

(D)

A detailed estimate of budget requirements, including the costs associated with the plans outlined under subparagraphs (A) through (C), over the 10-year period following the date of the report.

(E)

A detailed description of the steps taken to implement the plan submitted in the previous year.

(b)

Advice of directors of nuclear facilities and laboratories

Together with the budget of the President submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, during each fiscal year in which a report is transmitted under subsection (a), the directors of the nuclear facilities and laboratories shall each submit to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy an independent report on the implementation of and the funding for the plans outlined under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(2).

(c)

Form

Each report required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form (including as much detail as possible), but may include a classified annex.

(d)

Definitions

In this section:

(1)

The term covered nuclear systems means the following:

(A)

B–52H or B–2 bomber aircraft and nuclear air-launched cruise missiles.

(B)

Trident ballistic missile submarines, launch tubes, and Trident D–5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

(C)

Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles and associated silos.

(D)

Nuclear warheads or gravity bombs that can be delivered by the systems specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).

(E)

Nuclear weapons delivered by means other than the systems specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).

(2)

The term nuclear facilities and laboratories means the following:

(A)

Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

(B)

Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

(C)

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.

(D)

The Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri.

(E)

The Nevada National Security Site, Nevada.

(F)

The Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas.

(G)

The Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.

(H)

The Y–12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

.

(b)

Clerical amendment

The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 494 the following new item:

495. Annual report on the plan for the modernization of the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery platforms.

.

10.

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility and Uranium Processing Facility

(a)

Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1)

The Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan for Fiscal Year 2011, dated May 2010, stated that the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement building and the Uranium Processing Facility are the highest physical infrastructure priorities for the nuclear enterprise.

(2)

The November 2010 update to the report required under section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) stated, The Administration is committed to fully fund the construction of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR)..

(3)

A Department of Energy briefing book regarding the fiscal year 2012 budget stated, with respect to the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility, The increased funding level in the FY 2012–FY 2016 period is needed to support the required schedule of construction completion in FY 2020 and a ramp-up to full operations by FY 2023..

(4)

The briefing book also stated, with respect to the Uranium Processing Facility, The increased funding level in the FY 2012–FY 2016 period is needed to support the NNSA’s priority to phase out operations in Building 9212 and move required chemical processing activities from Building 9212 into UPF in FY 2020, with a ramp-up to full operations in UPF by FY 2024..

(b)

CMRR and UPF

Of amounts authorized to be appropriated for weapons activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Secretary of Energy shall—

(1)

accelerate, to the extent possible, the design and engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility (in this section referred to as the nuclear facility) and the Uranium Processing Facility (in this section referred to as the processing facility) in order for—

(A)

the construction of both facilities to be completed by not later than 2020;

(B)

both the nuclear facility and the processing facility to begin nuclear operations by not later than 2020; and

(C)

both the nuclear facility and the processing facility to be fully operational by not later than 2023 and 2024, respectively; and

(2)

together with the budget of the President submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal years 2013 through 2024, submit to the congressional defense committees a report including—

(A)

certification of the acceleration described in paragraph (1); and

(B)

identification of the funding amounts necessary, including on a multiyear basis as appropriate, for the nuclear facility and the processing facility upon completion of the design and engineering phase of such facilities.

11.

Policy on non-nuclear weapons systems

It is the policy of the United States that conventionally armed, strategic-range weapons systems not co-located with nuclear armed systems do not affect strategic stability between the United States and the Russian Federation.

12.

Non-strategic nuclear weapon reductions and extended deterrence policy

(a)

Policy on non-Strategic nuclear weapons

It is the policy of the United States—

(1)

to pursue negotiations with the Russian Federation aimed at the reduction of deployed and non-deployed non-strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation;

(2)

that non-strategic nuclear weapons should be considered when weighing the balance of the nuclear forces of the United States and Russia; and

(3)

that any geographical relocation or storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons by Russia does not constitute a reduction or elimination of such weapons.

(b)

Policy on extended deterrence commitment to Europe

It is the policy of the United States that—

(1)

it maintains its commitment to extended deterrence, specifically the nuclear alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as an important component of ensuring and linking the national security interests of the United States and the security of its European allies;

(2)

forward-deployed nuclear forces of the United States shall remain based in Europe in support of the nuclear policy and posture of NATO; and

(3)

the presence of nuclear weapons of the United States in Europe—combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons—contributes to the cohesion of NATO and provides reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats.

(c)

Limitation on reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear forces based in Europe

In light of the policy expressed in subsections (a) and (b), no action may be taken to effect or implement the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear forces of the United States that are based in Europe unless—

(1)

the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of such nuclear forces is requested by the government of the host nation in the manner provided in the agreement between the United States and the host nation regarding the forces; or

(2)

the President certifies that—

(A)

NATO member states have considered the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal in the High Level Group and NATO has decided to support such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal; and

(B)

each NATO member state has separately concurred that the remaining nuclear forces of the United States that are based in Europe after such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal would provide a commensurate or better level of assurance and credibility as before such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal.

(d)

Notification

Upon any decision to reduce, consolidate, or withdraw the nuclear forces of the United States that are based in Europe, the President shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a notification containing—

(1)

the certification required by subsection (c)(2);

(2)

justification for such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal; and

(3)

an assessment of how NATO member states, in light of such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal, assess the credibility of the deterrence capability of the United States in support of its commitments undertaken pursuant to article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington, District of Columbia, on April 4, 1949, and entered into force on August 24, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964).

(e)

Notice and wait requirement

The President may not commence a reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of the nuclear forces of the United States that are based in Europe for which the certification required by subsection (c)(2) is made until the expiration of a 180-day period beginning on the date on which the President submits the report under subsection (d) containing the certification.