H.R. 783 (113^th): Prevent Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons and Stop War Through Diplomacy Act

In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech on December 10, 2009, President Obama said, I know that engagement with repressive regimes lacks the satisfying purity of indignation. But I also know that sanctions without outreach—and condemnation without discussion—can carry forward a crippling status quo. No repressive regime can move down a new path unless it has the choice of an open door..

President Obama stated on November 14, 2012, that, With respect to Iran, I very much want to see a diplomatic resolution to the problem. I was very clear before the campaign, I was clear during the campaign and I’m now clear after the campaign—we’re not going to let Iran get a nuclear weapon. But I think there is still a window of time for us to resolve this diplomatically. We’ve imposed the toughest sanctions in history. It is having an impact on Iran’s economy. There should be a way in which they can enjoy peaceful nuclear power while still meeting their international obligations and providing clear assurances to the international community that they’re not pursuing a nuclear weapon..

While the United States has engaged in direct negotiations with Iran without preconditions under the Obama Administration, official representatives of the United States and official representatives of Iran have held only two direct, bilateral meetings in over 30 years, both of which occurred in October 2009, one on the sidelines of the United Nations Security Council negotiations in Geneva, and one on the sidelines of negotiations brokered by the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (referred to in this Act as the IAEA) in Vienna.

Resolving all of the outstanding issues between the United States and Iran cannot be achieved instantaneously and will require a robust, sustained diplomatic effort involving multilateral and bilateral negotiations.

Under the Department of State’s current no contact policy, officers and employees of the Department of State are not permitted to make any direct contact with official representatives of the Government of Iran without express prior authorization from the Secretary of State.

On September 20, 2011, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen called for establishing direct communications with Iran, stating, I’m talking about any channel that’s open. We’ve not had a direct link of communication with Iran since 1979. And I think that has planted many seeds for miscalculation. When you miscalculate, you can escalate and misunderstand..

While the International Atomic Energy Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran and has inspectors and monitoring devices located at Iranian nuclear facilities, the agency has expressed concerns regarding Iran’s past and ongoing nuclear work that can only be resolved through increased transparency, more robust safeguards, and a more vigorous inspections regime.

On October 3, 2012, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated, The results of an American or Israeli military strike on Iran could, in my view, prove catastrophic, haunting us for generations in that part of the world., adding that [S]uch an attack would make a nuclear-armed Iran inevitable. They would just bury the program deeper and make it more covert..

to prevent Iran from pursuing or acquiring a nuclear weapon and to resolve the concerns of the United States and of the international community about Iran’s nuclear program and Iran’s human rights obligations under international and Iranian law;

to ensure inspection of suspected prohibited cargo to or from Iran, as well as the seizure and disposal of prohibited items, as authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 (June 9, 2010);

to pursue sustained, direct, bilateral negotiations with the Government of Iran without preconditions in order to reduce tensions, prevent war, prevent nuclear proliferation, support human rights, and seek resolutions to issues that concern the United States and the international community;

to utilize all diplomatic tools, including engaging in direct bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, leveraging sanctions, engaging in Track II diplomacy, creating a special envoy described in section 4, and enlisting the support of all interested parties to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and to prevent war;

to secure an agreement that ensures Iran does not engage in nuclear weapons work and that Iran’s nuclear enrichment program is verifiably limited to civilian purposes through the implementation of robust safeguards and enhanced IAEA inspections, including through the implementation of the Additional Protocol;

to pursue opportunities to build mutual trust and to foster sustained negotiations in good faith with Iran and to explore areas of mutual benefit to both Iran and the United States, such as regional security, the long-term stabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan, the establishment of a framework for peaceful nuclear energy production, other peaceful energy modernization programs, and counter-narcotics efforts; and

that no funds appropriated or otherwise made available to any executive agency of the Government of the United States may be used to carry out any military operation or activity against Iran unless the President determines that a military operation or activity is warranted and seeks express prior authorization by Congress, as required under article I, section 8, clause 2 of the United States Constitution, which grants Congress the sole authority to declare war, except that this requirement shall not apply to a military operation or activity—