H.R. 893: Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013

113th Congress, 2013–2015. Text as of Feb 28, 2013 (Introduced).

Status & Summary | PDF | Source: GPO and Cato Institute Deepbills

I

113th CONGRESS

1st Session

H. R. 893

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

February 28, 2013

(for herself and Mr. Sherman) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Oversight and Government Reform, the Judiciary, Science, Space, and Technology, Financial Services, and Transportation and Infrastructure, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To provide for the imposition of sanctions with respect to foreign persons who transfer to or acquire from Iran, North Korea, or Syria certain goods, services, or technology that contribute to the proliferation activities of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, and for other purposes.

1.

Short title and table of contents

(a)

Short title

This Act may be cited as the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013 .

(b)

Table of contents

The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.

Sec. 2. Statement of policy.

Sec. 3. Imposition of sanctions against certain foreign persons.

Sec. 4. Determination exempting a foreign person from the imposition of certain sanctions.

Sec. 5. Restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries aiding proliferation by Iran, North Korea, or Syria.

Sec. 6. Identification of countries that enable proliferation to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria.

Sec. 7. Prohibition on United States assistance to countries assisting proliferation activities by Iran, North Korea, or Syria.

Sec. 8. Restriction on extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space Station.

Sec. 9. Exclusion from the United States of senior officials of foreign persons who have aided proliferation relating to Iran, North Korea, and Syria.

Sec. 10. Prohibition on certain vessels landing in the United States; enhanced inspections.

Sec. 11. Sanctions with respect to critical defense resources provided to or acquired from Iran, North Korea, or Syria.

Sec. 12. Multilateral actions against Iran, North Korea, or Syria.

Sec. 13. Repeal of waiver of sanctions relating to development of weapons of mass destruction or other military capabilities.

Sec. 14. Definitions.

Sec. 15. Repeal of Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act.

Sec. 16. Rule of construction.

2.

Statement of policy

It shall be the policy of the United States to fully implement and enforce sanctions against any person, entity, or country that assists the proliferation activities or policies of Iran, North Korea, or Syria.

3.

Imposition of sanctions against certain foreign persons

(a)

In general

Not later than 90 days after the day of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose, for a period of not less than two years, the sanctions specified in subsection (c) with respect to a foreign person if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the person—

(1)
(A)

on or after September 1, 2007, transferred to or acquired from Iran, North Korea, or Syria—

(i)

goods, services, or technology listed on—

(I)

the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions) and Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 2, and subsequent revisions);

(II)

the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent revisions;

(III)

the lists of items and substances relating to biological and chemical weapons the export of which is controlled by the Australia Group;

(IV)

the Schedule One or Schedule Two list of toxic chemicals and precursors the export of which is controlled pursuant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; or

(V)

the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996, and subsequent revisions; or

(ii)

goods, services, or technology not listed on any list specified in clause (i) but which nevertheless would be, if such goods, services, or technology were United States goods, services, or technology, prohibited for export to Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, because of the potential of such goods, services or technology to contribute to the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise missile systems or destabilizing types and amounts of conventional weapons; and

(B)

with respect to the transfer of goods, services, or technology, knew or should have known that the transfer of goods, services, or technology, to Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, would contribute to the ability of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, to—

(i)

acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies; or

(ii)

acquire or develop advanced or destabilizing types and numbers of conventional weapons;

(2)
(A)

on or after September 1, 2007, transferred to another person goods, services, or technology described in paragraph (1)(A)(i) or (ii); and

(B)

knew or should have known that the transfer of goods, services, or technology to another person would likely result in such other person exporting, transferring, transshipping, or otherwise providing the goods, services, technology to the Government of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, or to a person acting on behalf of or owned or controlled by, the Government of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be;

(3)

on or after September 1, 2007, acquired materials mined or otherwise extracted within the territory or control of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, for purposes relating to the nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ballistic or cruise missile development programs of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be;

(4)

on or after September 1, 2007, transferred to Iran, Syria, or North Korea goods, services, or technology that could assist efforts to extract or mill uranium ore within the territory or control of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be;

(5)

on or after September 1, 2007, provided destabilizing types and amounts of conventional weapons and technical assistance to the Government of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, or to a person acting on behalf of or owned or controlled by, the Government of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be; or

(6)

on or after August 10, 2010, provided a vessel, insurance or reinsurance, or any other shipping service for the transportation of goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria for purposes relating to the nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ballistic or cruise missile development programs of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be.

(b)

Joint ventures relating to the mining, production, or transportation of uranium

(1)

In general

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose, for a period of not less than two years, the sanctions specified in subsection (c) with respect to a foreign person if the President determines that the person knowingly participated, on or after August 10, 2012, in a joint venture that involves any activity relating to the mining, production, or transportation of uranium—

(A)
(i)

established on or after February 2, 2012; and

(ii)

with—

(I)

the Government of Iran, the Government of North Korea, or the Government of Syria;

(II)

an entity incorporated and subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran, in North Korea or subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of North Korea, or Syria or subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Syria, as the case may be; or

(III)

a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, the Government of Iran or an entity described in subclause (II) with respect to Iran, the Government of North Korea or an entity described in subclause (II) with respect to North Korea, or the Government of Syria or an entity described in subclause (II) with respect to Syria, as the case may be; or

(B)
(i)

established before February 2, 2012;

(ii)

with the Government of Iran, an entity described in subclause (II) of subparagraph (A)(ii) with respect to Iran, or a person described in subclause (III) of that subparagraph with respect to Iran, the Government of North Korea, an entity described in subclause (II) of subparagraph (A)(ii) with respect to North Korea, or a person described in subclause (III) of that subparagraph with respect to North Korea, or the Government of Syria, an entity described in subclause (II) of subparagraph (A)(ii) with respect to Syria, or a person described in subclause (III) of that subparagraph with respect to Syria, as the case may; and

(iii)

through which—

(I)

uranium is transferred directly to Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, or indirectly to Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, through a third country;

(II)

the Government of Iran, the Government of North Korea, or the Government of Syria, as the case may be, receives significant revenue; or

(III)

Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, could, through a direct operational role or by other means, receive technological knowledge or equipment not previously available to such country that could contribute materially to the ability of such country to develop nuclear weapons or related technologies.

(2)

Applicability of sanctions

Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to participation in a joint venture established before August 10, 2012, if the person participating in the joint venture terminated, with respect to Iran, that participation not later than the date that is 180 days after such such date with respect to North Korea and Syria, terminates that participation not later than the date that is 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

(c)

Description of sanctions

The sanctions referred to in subsections (a) and (b) are the following:

(1)

Executive Order 12938 prohibitions

The measures specified in the first sentence of subsection (b) and subsections (c) and (d) of section 4 of Executive Order 12938 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction).

(2)

Arms export prohibition

Prohibition on United States Government sales to a person described in subsection (a) or subsection (b) of any item on the United States Munitions List and termination of sales to such person of any defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).

(3)

Dual use export prohibition

Denial of licenses and suspension of existing licenses for the transfer to a foreign person described in subsection (a) or subsection (b) of items the export of which is controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.), as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or the Export Administration Regulations.

(4)

Investment prohibition

Prohibition on any investment by a United States person in property, including entities, owned or controlled by a foreign person described in subsection (a) or subsection (b).

(5)

Financing prohibition

Prohibition on any approval, financing, or guarantee by a United States person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person described in subsection (a) or subsection (b).

(6)

Financial assistance prohibition

Denial by the United States Government of any credit, credit guarantees, grants, or other financial assistance by any agency of the United States Government to a foreign person described in subsection (a) or subsection (b).

(7)

Ban on investment in equity or debt of sanctioned person

Prohibition on any United States person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a foreign person described in subsection (a) or subsection (b).

(8)

Exclusion of corporate officers

The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United States, any alien that the President determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling interest in, a foreign person described in subsection (a) or subsection (b).

(9)

Sanctions on principal executive officers

The President shall impose on the principal executive officer or officers of a foreign person described in subsection (a) or subsection (b), or on persons performing similar functions and with similar authorities as such officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this subsection.

(d)

Publication in Federal Register

(1)

In general

The Secretary of the Treasury shall publish in the Federal Register notice of the imposition against a foreign person of sanctions pursuant to subsection (a) or subsection (b).

(2)

Content

Each notice published in accordance with paragraph (1) shall include the name and address (where known) of each foreign person with respect to which sanctions have been imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of subsection (b).

4.

Determination exempting a foreign person from the imposition of certain sanctions

(a)

In general

The imposition of any sanction described in section 3(c) to a foreign person described in subsection (a) or (b) of section 3 shall cease to be effective beginning 30 days after the date on which the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(1)

in the case of a transfer or acquisition of goods, services, or technology described in section 3(a)(1)

(A)

such person did not, on or after September 1, 2007, knowingly transfer to or acquire from Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, such goods, services, or technology the apparent transfer of which caused such person to be subject to sanctions under section 3;

(B)

such transfer did not contribute to the efforts of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, to develop—

(i)

nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ballistic or cruise missile systems, or weapons listed on the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List of July 12, 1996, or any subsequent revision of such List; or

(ii)

destabilizing types or amounts of conventional weapons or acquire technical assistance;

(C)

such person is subject to the primary jurisdiction of a government that is an adherent to one or more relevant nonproliferation regimes or that has a sanctions regime under its governing foreign law concerning Iran, North Korea, or Syria, and such transfer was made in accordance with the guidelines and parameters of all such relevant nonproliferation or sanctions regimes; or

(D)

the government with primary jurisdiction over such person has imposed meaningful penalties on such person on account of the transfer of such goods, services, or technology that caused such person to be subject to sanctions under section 3;

(2)

in the case of an acquisition of materials mined or otherwise extracted within the territory of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, described in section 3(a)(2) for purposes relating to the nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ballistic or cruise missile development programs of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, such person did not acquire such materials; or

(3)

in the case of the provision of a vessel, insurance or reinsurance, or another shipping service for the transportation of goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, described in section 3(a)(3) for purposes relating to the nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ballistic or cruise missile development programs of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, such person did not provide such a vessel or service.

(b)

Opportunity To provide information

Congress urges the President

(1)

in every appropriate case, to contact in a timely fashion each person described in subsection (a) or (b) of section 3, or the government with primary jurisdiction over such person, in order to afford such person, or such government, the opportunity to provide explanatory, exculpatory, or other additional information with respect to the transfer that caused such person to be subject to sanctions under section 3; and

(2)

to exercise the authority described in subsection (a) in all cases in which information obtained from each person described in subsection (a) or (b) of section 3, or from the government with primary jurisdiction over such person, establishes that the exercise of such authority is warranted.

(c)

Form of transmission

(1)

In general

Except as provided in paragraph (2), the determination and report of the President under subsection (a) shall be transmitted in unclassified form.

(2)

Exception

The determination and report of the President under subsection (a) may be transmitted in classified form if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that it is vital to the national security interests of the United States to do so.

5.

Restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries aiding proliferation by Iran, North Korea, or Syria

(a)

In general

(1)

Restrictions

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(A)

no agreement for cooperation between the United States and the government of any country that is assisting the nuclear program of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Iran, North Korea, or Syria may be submitted to the President or to Congress pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153),

(B)

no such agreement may enter into force with respect to such country,

(C)

no license may be issued for export directly or indirectly to such country of any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology that would be subject to such agreement, and

(D)

no approval may be given for the transfer or retransfer directly or indirectly to such country of any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology that would be subject to such agreement,

until the President makes the determination and report under paragraph (2).
(2)

Determination and report

The determination and report referred to in paragraph (1) are a determination and report by the President, submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, that—

(A)

Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may, has ceased its efforts to design, develop, or acquire a nuclear explosive device or related materials or technology; or

(B)

the government of the country that is assisting the nuclear programs of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be—

(i)

has suspended all nuclear assistance to Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, and all transfers of advanced conventional weapons and missiles to Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be; and

(ii)

is committed to maintaining that suspension until Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, has implemented measures that would permit the President to make the determination described in subparagraph (A).

(b)

Rules of construction

The restrictions described in subsection (a)(1)

(1)

shall apply in addition to all other applicable procedures, requirements, and restrictions described in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and other applicable Acts;

(2)

shall not be construed as affecting the validity of an agreement for cooperation between the United States and the government of a country that is in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(3)

shall not be construed as applying to assistance for the Bushehr nuclear reactor, unless such assistance is determined by the President to be contributing to the efforts of Iran to develop nuclear weapons.

(c)

Definitions

In this section:

(1)

Agreement for cooperation

The term agreement for cooperation has the meaning given that term in section 11 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.).

(2)

Assisting the nuclear program of iran, north korea, or syria

The term assisting the nuclear program of Iran, North Korea, or Syria means the intentional transfer to Iran, North Korea, or Syria by a government, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of a government with the knowledge and acquiescence of that government, of goods, services, or technology listed on the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions), or the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIR/254/Rev. 3/Part 2, and subsequent revisions).

(3)

Country that is assisting the nuclear program of iran, north korea, or syria or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to iran, north korea, or syria

The term country that is assisting the nuclear program of Iran, North Korea, or Syria or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Iran, North Korea, or Syria means any country determined by the President to be assisting the nuclear program of Iran, North Korea, or Syria or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Iran, North Korea, or Syria.

(4)

Transfer

The term transfer means the conveyance of technological or intellectual property, or the conversion of intellectual or technological advances into marketable goods, services, or articles of value, developed and generated in one place, to another through illegal or illicit means to a country, the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)), and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(5)

Transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to iran, north korea, or syria

The term transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Iran, North Korea, or Syria means the intentional transfer to Iran, North Korea, or Syria by a government, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of a government with the knowledge and acquiescence of that government, of goods, services, or technology listed on—

(A)

the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996, and subsequent revisions; or

(B)

the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent revisions.

6.

Identification of countries that enable proliferation to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria

(a)

Annual report

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 120 days thereafter, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to the public a report that identifies each person subject to sanctions under section 3 and each foreign country that allows one or more persons under the jurisdiction of such country to engage in activities that are sanctionable under section 3 despite requests by the United States Government to the government of such country to prevent such activities.

(b)

Form

The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex if necessary to protect United States national security interests.

7.

Prohibition on United States assistance to countries assisting proliferation activities by Iran, North Korea, or Syria

(a)

In general

The President shall prohibit assistance (other than humanitarian assistance) under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and shall not issue export licenses for defense articles or defense services under the Arms Export Control Act to—

(1)

a foreign country the government of which the President has received credible information is assisting Iran, North Korea, or Syria in the acquisition, development, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles; or

(2)

a foreign country identified in the most-recent report transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees under section 6(a).

(b)

Resumption of assistance

The President is authorized to provide assistance described in subsection (a) to a foreign country subject to the prohibition in subsection (a) if the President determines and notifies the appropriate congressional committees that there is credible information that the government of the country is no longer assisting Iran, North Korea, or Syria in the acquisition, development, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles and has taken appropriate steps to correct the behavior that resulted in it being included in the report in section 6(A).

(c)

Definition

In this section, the term assisting means providing material or financial support of any kind, including purchasing of material, technology or equipment from Iran, North Korea, or Syria.

8.

Restriction on extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space Station

(a)

Restriction

(1)

In general

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no agency of the United States Government may make extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space Station to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, any organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, or any other organization, entity, or element of the Government of the Russian Federation, unless, during the fiscal year in which such extraordinary payments are to be made, the President has made the determination described in subsection (b), and reported such determination to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

(2)

Waiver

If the President is unable to make the determination described in subsection (b) with respect to a fiscal year in which extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space Station are to be made, the President is authorized to waive the application of paragraph (1) on a case-by-case basis with respect to the fiscal year if not less than 15 days prior to the date on which the waiver is to take effect the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains—

(A)

the reasons why the determination described in subsection (b) cannot be made;

(B)

the amount of the extraordinary payment to be made under the waiver;

(C)

the steps being undertaken by the United States to ensure compliance by the Russian Federation with the conditions described in subsection (b); and

(D)

a determination of the President that the waiver is vital to the national interests of the United States.

(b)

Determination regarding Russian cooperation in preventing proliferation relating to Iran, North Korea, and Syria

The determination referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by the President that—

(1)

it is the policy of the Government of the Russian Federation (including the law enforcement, export promotion, export control, and intelligence agencies of such Government) to oppose the proliferation to or from Iran, North Korea, and Syria of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems capable of delivering such weapons;

(2)

the Government of the Russian Federation (including the law enforcement, export promotion, export control, and intelligence agencies of such Government) has demonstrated and continues to demonstrate a sustained commitment to seek out and prevent the transfer to or from Iran, North Korea, and Syria of goods, services, and technology that could make a contribute to the nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise missile systems development programs of Iran; and

(3)

neither the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, nor any organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, has, during the one-year period ending on the date of the determination under this subsection made transfers to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria subject to sanctions under section 3(a) (other than transfers with respect to which a determination pursuant to section 5 has been or will be made).

(c)

Prior notification

Not less than five days before making a determination under this section, the President shall notify the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate of the President’s intention to make such a determination.

(d)

Written justification

A determination of the President under this section shall include a written justification describing in detail the facts and circumstances supporting the President’s conclusion.

(e)

Transmission in classified form

If the President considers it appropriate, a determination of the President under this section, a prior notification under subsection (c), and a written justification under subsection (d), or appropriate parts thereof, may be transmitted in classified form.

(f)

Exception for crew safety

(1)

Exception

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration may make extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space Station to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or any organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, or any subcontractor thereof, that would otherwise be prohibited under this section if the President notifies Congress in writing that such payments are necessary to prevent the imminent loss of life of or grievous injury to individuals aboard the International Space Station.

(2)

Report

Not later than 30 days after notifying Congress that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will make extraordinary payments under paragraph (1), the President shall transmit to Congress a report describing—

(A)

the extent to which the provisions of subsection (b) had been met as of the date of notification; and

(B)

the measures that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is taking to ensure that—

(i)

the conditions posing a threat of imminent loss of life of or grievous injury to individuals aboard the International Space Station necessitating the extraordinary payments are not repeated; and

(ii)

it is no longer necessary to make extraordinary payments in order to prevent imminent loss of life of or grievous injury to individuals aboard the International Space Station.

(g)

Service Module exception

(1)

In general

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration may make extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space Station to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, any organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, or any subcontractor thereof, that would otherwise be prohibited under this section for the construction, testing, preparation, delivery, launch, or maintenance of the Service Module, and for the purchase (at a total cost not to exceed $14,000,000) of the pressure dome for the Interim Control Module and the Androgynous Peripheral Docking Adapter and related hardware for the United States propulsion module, if—

(A)

the President has notified Congress at least five days before making such payments;

(B)

the entity is not subject to sanctions under section 3(a) with respect to an activity of the entity to receive such payment, and the President has no credible information of any activity that would require such a report; and

(C)

the United States will receive goods or services of value to the United States commensurate with the value of the extraordinary payments made.

(2)

Definition

For purposes of this subsection, the term maintenance means activities that cannot be performed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and which must be performed in order for the Service Module to provide environmental control, life support, and orbital maintenance functions which cannot be performed by an alternative means at the time of payment.

(3)

Termination

This subsection shall cease to be effective on the date that is 60 days after the date on which a United States propulsion module is in place at the International Space Station.

(h)

Exception

No agency of the United States Government may make extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space Station, or any other payments in connection with the International Space Station, to any foreign person subject to measures applied pursuant to section 4 of Executive Order 12938 (November 14, 1994), as amended by Executive Order 13094 (July 28, 1998).

(i)

Report on certain payments related to International Space Station

(1)

In general

The President shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that identifies each Russian entity or person to whom the United States Government has, since November 22, 2005, made a payment in cash or in kind for work to be performed or services to be rendered under the Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, with annex, signed at Washington January 29, 1998, and entered into force March 27, 2001, or any protocol, agreement, memorandum of understanding, or contract related thereto.

(2)

Content

Each report transmitted under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A)

the specific purpose of each payment made to each entity or person identified in such report; and

(B)

with respect to each such payment, the assessment of the President that the payment was not prejudicial to the achievement of the objectives of the United States Government to prevent the proliferation of ballistic or cruise missile systems in Iran and other countries that have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of State under section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).

9.

Exclusion from the United States of senior officials of foreign persons who have aided proliferation relating to Iran, North Korea, and Syria

Except as provided in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien whom the Secretary of State determines is an alien who, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is a—

(1)

corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a controlling interest of a foreign person subject to sanctions under section 3(a);

(2)

corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a controlling interest of a successor entity to, or a parent or subsidiary of, a foreign person identified in such a report;

(3)

corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a controlling interest of an affiliate of a foreign person identified in such a report, if such affiliate engaged in the activities referred to in such report, and if such affiliate is controlled in fact by the foreign person identified in such report; or

(4)

spouse, minor child, or agent of a person excludable under paragraph (1), (2), or (3).

10.

Prohibition on certain vessels landing in the United States; enhanced inspections

The Ports and Waterways Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1221 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

16.

Prohibition on certain vessels landing in the United States; enhanced inspections

(a)

Certification requirement

(1)

In general

Beginning on the date of enactment of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013, before a vessel arrives at a port in the United States, the owner, charterer, operator, or master of the vessel shall certify that the vessel did not enter a port in Iran, North Korea, or Syria during the 180-day period ending on the date of arrival of the vessel at the port in the United States.

(2)

False certifications

The Secretary shall prohibit from landing at a port in the United States for a period of at least 2 years—

(A)

any vessel for which a false certification was made under section (a); and

(B)

any other vessel owned or operated by a parent corporation, partnership, association, or individual proprietorship of the vessel for which the false certification was made.

(b)

Enhanced inspections

The Secretary shall—

(1)

identify foreign ports at which vessels have landed during the preceding 12-month period that have also landed at ports in Iran, North Korea, or Syria during that period; and

(2)

inspect vessels arriving in the United States from foreign ports identified under paragraph (1) to establish whether the vessel was involved, during the 12-month period ending on the date of arrival of the vessel at the port in the United States, in any activity that would be subject to sanctions under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of 2013 .

.

11.

Sanctions with respect to critical defense resources provided to or acquired from Iran, North Korea, or Syria

(a)

In general

The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) to any person the President determines is, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, providing to, or acquiring from, Iran, North Korea, or Syria any goods, services, or technology the person knows, or should know, is used, or is likely to be used, for military application.

(b)

Sanctions described

The sanctions described in this subsection are, with respect to a person described in subsection (a), the following:

(1)

Foreign exchange

Prohibiting any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which that person has any interest.

(2)

Banking transactions

Prohibiting any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any interest of that person.

(3)

Property transactions

Prohibiting any person from—

(A)

acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring, withdrawing, transporting, or exporting any property that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and with respect to which the person described in subsection (a) has any interest;

(B)

dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to such property; or

(C)

conducting any transaction involving such property.

(4)

Loan guarantees

Prohibiting the head of any Federal agency from providing a loan guarantee to that person.

(5)

Additional sanctions

Additional sanctions, as appropriate, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(c)

Restrictions on export licenses for nuclear cooperation and certain loan guarantees

Before issuing a license for the exportation of any article pursuant to an agreement for cooperation under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) or approving a loan guarantee or any other assistance provided by the United States Government with respect to a nuclear energy project, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall certify to Congress that issuing the license or approving the loan guarantee or other assistance (as the case may be) will not permit the transfer of any good or technology described in subsection (a) to Iran, North Korea, or Syria.

(d)

Exception

The sanctions described in subsection (b) shall not apply to the repayment or other satisfaction of a loan or other obligation incurred under a program of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, as in effect as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

12.

Multilateral actions against Iran, North Korea, or Syria

(a)

Prohibition on United States assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency

(1)

Prohibition

No funds from any United States assessed or voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may be used to support any assistance provided by the IAEA through its Technical Cooperation Program to Iran, North Korea, or Syria.

(2)

Waiver

The provisions of paragraph (1) may be waived if—

(A)

the IAEA has suspended all assistance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program to Iran, North Korea, and Syria; and

(B)

the President certifies that Iran, North Korea, and Syria—

(i)

no longer pose a threat to the national security, interests, and allies of the United States; and

(ii)

are no longer in violation of their international nonproliferation obligations and United Nations Security Council resolutions.

(3)

United States actions at IAEA

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block the allocation of funds for any assistance provided by the IAEA through its Technical Cooperation Program to Iran, North Korea, or Syria.

(b)

Declaration of policy relating to Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

(1)

Findings

Congress finds the following:

(A)

The Governments of Iran, North Korea, and Syria are in clear violation of international nonproliferation agreements and United Nations Security Council resolutions.

(B)

The pursuit by the Governments of Iran, North Korea, and Syria of covert nuclear activities and their refusal to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency in its past and current investigations into their nuclear programs are further evidence of their disregard for their nonproliferation obligations.

(C)

The Governments of Iran, North Korea, and Syria are not in good standing with respect to their nonproliferation obligations.

(D)

The actions of the Governments of Iran, North Korea, and Syria have demonstrated their respective nuclear programs are not for peaceful use.

(2)

Declaration of policy

Congress declares that the Governments of Iran, North Korea, and Syria have forfeited all privileges under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including access to nuclear equipment, materials, and information.

(3)

Denial of NPT privileges to Iran, North Korea, and Syria

The United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the United States Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to secure adoption of a resolution at the United Nations Security Council and at the IAEA declaring that Iran, North Korea, and Syria have forfeited all privileges under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(c)

Report

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the implementation of this section.

13.

Repeal of waiver of sanctions relating to development of weapons of mass destruction or other military capabilities

Section 9(c)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1)

by striking subparagraph (B);

(2)

by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (B); and

(3)

in subparagraph (B) (as redesignated by paragraph (2) of this section)—

(A)

by striking or (B) each place it appears; and

(B)

by striking , as applicable.

14.

Definitions

In this Act:

(1)

Adherent to relevant nonproliferation regime

A government is an adherent to a relevant nonproliferation regime if such government—

(A)

is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group with respect to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in section 3(a)(1)(A)(i);

(B)

is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime with respect to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in section 3(a)(1)(A)(ii), or is a party to a binding international agreement with the United States that was in effect on January 1, 1999, to control the transfer of such goods, services, or technology in accordance with the criteria and standards set forth in the Missile Technology Control Regime;

(C)

is a member of the Australia Group with respect to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in section 3(a)(1)(A)(iii);

(D)

is a party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction with respect to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in section 3(a)(1)(A)(iv); or

(E)

is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement with respect to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in section 3(a)(1)(A)(v).

(2)

Appropriate congressional committees

The term appropriate congressional committees means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

(3)

Extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space Station

The term extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space Station means payments in cash or in kind made or to be made by the United States Government—

(A)

for work on the International Space Station which the Government of the Russian Federation pledged at any time to provide at its expense, or

(B)

for work on the International Space Station not required to be made under the terms of a contract or other agreement that was in effect on January 1, 1999, as such terms were in effect on such date,

except that such term does not mean payments in cash or in kind made or to be made by the United States Government before December 31, 2020, for work to be performed or services to be rendered before such date necessary to meet United States obligations under the Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, with annex, signed at Washington January 29, 1998, and entered into force March 27, 2001, or any protocol, agreement, memorandum of understanding, or contract related thereto.
(4)

Foreign person

The term foreign person means—

(A)

a natural person who is an alien;

(B)

a corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, successor, subunit, or subsidiary organized under the laws of a foreign country or that has its principal place of business in a foreign country; and

(C)
(i)

any foreign government; or

(ii)

any foreign government agency or entity.

(5)

Knowingly

The term knowingly, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person knew, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result of such conduct, circumstance, or result.

(6)

Organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency

(A)

Definition

The term organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency means an organization or entity that—

(i)

was made part of the Russian Space Agency upon its establishment on February 25, 1992;

(ii)

was transferred to the Russian Space Agency by decree of the Government of the Russian Federation on July 25, 1994, or May 12, 1998;

(iii)

was or is transferred to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency by decree of the Government of the Russian Federation at any other time before, on, or after March 14, 2000; or

(iv)

is a joint stock company in which the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency has at any time held controlling interest.

(B)

Extension

Any organization or entity described in subparagraph (A) shall be deemed to be under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency regardless of whether—

(i)

such organization or entity, after being part of or transferred to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency, is removed from or transferred out of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency; or

(ii)

the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency, after holding a controlling interest in such organization or entity, divests its controlling interest.

(7)

Subsidiary

The term subsidiary means an entity (including a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other organization) of a parent company that controls, directly or indirectly, the other entity.

(8)

Transfer or transferred

The term transfer or transferred, with respect to a good, service, or technology, includes—

(A)

the conveyance of technological or intellectual property; and

(B)

the conversion of technological or intellectual advances into marketable goods, services, or technology of value that is developed and generated in one location and transferred to another location through illegal or illicit means.

(9)

United States person

The term United States person means—

(A)

a natural person who is a citizen or resident of the United States; or

(B)

an entity that is organized under the laws of the United States or any State or territory thereof.

(10)

Vessel

The term vessel has the meaning given such term in section 1081 of title 18, United States Code. Such term also includes aircraft, regardless of whether or not the type of aircraft at issue is described in such section.

(11)

Technical assistance

The term technical assistance means providing of advice, assistance, and training pertaining to the installation, operation, and maintenance of equipment for destabilizing types and forms of conventional weapons.

15.

Repeal of Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act

(a)

Repeal

The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is repealed.

(b)

References

Any reference in a law, regulation, document, or other record of the United States to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act shall be deemed to be a reference to this Act.

16.

Rule of construction

Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act—

(1)

shall be construed to limit the authority of the President to impose additional sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), relevant Executive orders, and other provisions of law; or

(2)

shall apply to the authorized intelligence activities of the United States.