S. 3153 (115^th): Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The Central Intelligence Agency.

The Department of Defense.

The Defense Intelligence Agency.

The National Security Agency.

The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

The Coast Guard.

The Department of State.

The Department of the Treasury.

The Department of Energy.

The Department of Justice.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Drug Enforcement Administration.

The National Reconnaissance Office.

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

The Department of Homeland Security.

Waivers for covert actions

Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094) is amended—

Waivers for major systems acquisitions

Such section, as amended by paragraph (1), is further amended—

Fiscal year 2018

The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2018, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations for fiscal year 2018 prepared to accompany this Act.

Fiscal year 2019

The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2019, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations for fiscal year 2019 prepared to accompany this Act.

Availability

The classified Schedules of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

Distribution by the President

Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedules of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch.

Limits on disclosure

The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedules of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such element; or

10 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such element for the purposes of converting the performance of any function by contractors to performance by civilian personnel.

a student program, trainee program, or similar program;

a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or

details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.

a written notice of the exercise of such authority; and

in the case of an exercise of such authority subject to the limitation in subsection (a)(2), a written justification for the contractor conversion that includes a comparison of whole-of-government costs.

Fiscal year 2018

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2018 the sum of $546,900,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2019.

Fiscal year 2019

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2019 the sum of $539,624,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2020.

Authorization of appropriations

Authorization of personnel

In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2018, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

In general

Section 221 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended—

Conforming amendments

by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and

by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

the standards under which such review will be conducted;

which positions should or should not be on the Executive Schedule; and

for those positions that should be on the Executive Schedule, the level of the Executive Schedule at which such positions should be placed.

a representative of the Defense Security Service of the Department of Defense;

a representative of the General Services Administration;

a representative of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy of the Office of Management and Budget;

a representative of the Department of Homeland Security;

the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center; and

such other members as the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.

In general

Not less frequently than once each year, the Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under subsection (a) shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the activities of the Task Force during the previous year, including identification of the supply chain and counterintelligence risks shared with the acquisition community of the United States Government by the intelligence community.

Appropriate congressional committees defined

In this subsection, the term appropriate congressional committees means the following:

Personal accounts

The term personal accounts means accounts for online and telecommunications services, including telephone, residential Internet access, email, text and multimedia messaging, cloud computing, social media, health care, and financial services, used by personnel of the intelligence community outside of the scope of their employment with elements of the intelligence community.

Personal technology devices

The term personal technology devices means technology devices used by personnel of the intelligence community outside of the scope of their employment with elements of the intelligence community, including networks to which such devices connect.

In general

Subject to a determination by the Director of National Intelligence, the Director may provide cyber protection support for the personal technology devices and personal accounts of the personnel described in paragraph (2).

At-risk personnel

The personnel described in this paragraph are personnel of the intelligence community—

to encourage personnel of the intelligence community to use personal technology devices for official business; or

to authorize cyber protection support for senior intelligence community personnel using personal devices, networks, and personal accounts in an official capacity.

a description of the methodology used to make the determination under subsection (a)(2); and

guidance for the use of cyber protection support and tracking of support requests for personnel receiving cyber protection support under subsection (a).

by redesignating subsections (f) and (g), as amended by subsections (a) and (b), as subsections (g) and (h), respectively; and

by inserting after subsection (e) the following:

In general

Except as provided in paragraph (2), in a case in which an officer described in subsection (a) has been nominated as described in such subsection and classification authority rests with the officer or another officer who reports directly to such officer, a classification decision with respect to information relating to the officer shall be made by the Director of National Intelligence.

Nominations of Director of National Intelligence

In a case described in paragraph (1) in which the officer nominated is the Director of National Intelligence, the classification decision shall be made by the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

Appropriate congressional committees

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

Congressional leadership

The term congressional leadership includes the following:

State

The term State means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.

complete an after action review of the posture of the intelligence community to collect against and analyze efforts of the Government of Russia to interfere in the 2016 Presidential election in the United States; and

submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the findings of the Director with respect to such review.

An assessment of whether the resources of the intelligence community were properly aligned to detect and respond to the efforts described in subsection (a)(1).

An assessment of the information sharing that occurred within elements of the intelligence community.

An assessment of the information sharing that occurred between elements of the intelligence community.

An assessment of applicable authorities necessary to collect on any such efforts and any deficiencies in those authorities.

A review of the use of open source material to inform analysis and warning of such efforts.

A review of the use of alternative and predictive analysis.

Appropriate congressional committees

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

Congressional leadership

The term congressional leadership includes the following:

Security vulnerability

The term security vulnerability has the meaning given such term in section 102 of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501).

commence not later than 1 year before any regularly scheduled Federal election and complete not later than 180 days before such election, an assessment of security vulnerabilities of State election systems; and

not later than 180 days before any regularly scheduled Federal election, submit a report on such security vulnerabilities and an assessment of foreign intelligence threats to the election to—

update the assessment of foreign intelligence threats to that election; and

submit the updated assessment to—

A whole-of-government approach to protecting United States electoral systems and processes that includes the agencies and departments indicated in subsection (a) as well as any other agencies and departments of the United States, as determined appropriate by the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Input solicited from Secretaries of State of the various States and the chief election officials of the States.

Technical security measures, including auditable paper trails for voting machines, securing wireless and Internet connections, and other technical safeguards.

Detection of cyber threats, including attacks and attempted attacks by Russian government or nongovernment cyber threat actors.

Improvement in the identification and attribution of Russian government or nongovernment cyber threat actors.

Deterrence, including actions and measures that could or should be undertaken against or communicated to the Government of Russia or other entities to deter attacks against, or interference with, United States election systems and processes.

Improvement in Federal Government communications with State and local election officials.

Public education and communication efforts.

Benchmarks and milestones to enable the measurement of concrete steps taken and progress made in the implementation of the strategy.

In general

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly brief the appropriate congressional committees on the strategy developed under subsection (a).

Appropriate congressional committees defined

In this subsection, the term appropriate congressional committees means the following:

In general

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall support the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and any other official of the Department of Homeland Security designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in sponsoring a security clearance up to the top secret level for each eligible chief election official of a State or the District of Columbia, and additional eligible designees of such election official as appropriate, at the time that such election official assumes such position.

Interim clearances

Consistent with applicable policies and directives, the Director of National Intelligence may issue interim clearances, for a period to be determined by the Director, to a chief election official as described in paragraph (1) and up to 1 designee of such official under such paragraph.

In general

The Director of National Intelligence shall assist the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis with sharing any appropriate classified information related to threats to election systems and to the integrity of the election process with chief election officials and such designees who have received a security clearance under subsection (a).

Coordination

The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with the Director of National Intelligence to facilitate the sharing of information to the affected Secretaries of State or States.

The Federal Government election security supply chain.

Election voting systems and software.

Voter registration databases.

Critical infrastructure related to elections.

Such other Government goods and services as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.

ensuring the trustworthiness and security of the workforce, facilities, and information of the Federal Government is of the highest priority to national security and public safety;

the President and Congress should prioritize the modernization of the personnel security framework to improve its efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability;

the current system for security clearance, suitability and fitness for employment, and credentialing lacks efficiencies and capabilities to meet the current threat environment, recruit and retain a trusted workforce, and capitalize on modern technologies; and

changes to policies or processes to improve this system should be vetted through the Council to ensure standardization, portability, and reciprocity in security clearances across the Federal Government.

Plans

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Council shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the following:

Report on the future of personnel security

Plan for implementation

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Council, in coordination with the members of the Council, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan to implement the report’s framework and recommendations submitted under paragraph (2)(A).

Congressional notifications

Not less frequently than monthly, the Security Executive Agent shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding the status of the disposition of requests received from departments and agencies of the Federal Government for a change to, or approval under, the Federal investigative standards, the national adjudicative guidelines, continuous evaluation, or other national policy regarding personnel security.

A review of whether the information requested on the Questionnaire for National Security Positions (Standard Form 86) and by the Federal Investigative Standards prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence appropriately support the adjudicative guidelines under Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (known as the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines). Such review shall include identification of whether any such information currently collected is unnecessary to support the adjudicative guidelines.

An assessment of whether such Questionnaire, Standards, and guidelines should be revised to account for the prospect of a holder of a security clearance becoming an insider threat.

Recommendations to improve the background investigation process by—

A policy and implementation plan for the issuance of interim security clearances.

A policy and implementation plan to ensure contractors are treated consistently in the security clearance process across agencies and departments of the United States as compared to employees of such agencies and departments. Such policy shall address—

A strategy and implementation plan that—

A policy and implementation plan for agencies and departments of the United States, as a part of the security clearance process, to accept automated records checks generated pursuant to a security clearance applicant’s employment with a prior employer.

A policy for the use of certain background materials on individuals collected by the private sector for background investigation purposes.

security clearances—

reciprocity of a security clearance at the same level are recognized in 2 weeks or fewer.

To direct the oversight of investigations, reinvestigations, adjudications, and, as applicable, polygraphs for eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position made by any Federal agency.

To review the national security background investigation and adjudication programs of Federal agencies to determine whether such programs are being implemented in accordance with this section.

To develop and issue uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, timely, and secure completion of investigations, polygraphs, and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.

Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to conduct investigations of persons who are proposed for access to classified information or for eligibility to hold a sensitive position to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, as applicable.

Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to determine eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position in accordance with Executive Order 12968 of August 2, 1995, as amended.

To ensure reciprocal recognition of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position among Federal agencies, including acting as the final authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes among such agencies involving the reciprocity of investigations and adjudications of eligibility.

To execute all other duties assigned to the Security Executive Agent by law.

issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of Federal agencies to ensure appropriate uniformity, centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, timeliness, and security in processes relating to determinations by such agencies of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, including such matters as investigations, polygraphs, adjudications, and reciprocity;

have the authority to grant exceptions to, or waivers of, national security investigative requirements, including issuing implementing or clarifying guidance, as necessary;

have the authority to assign, in whole or in part, to the head of any Federal agency (solely or jointly) any of the duties of the Security Executive Agent described in subsection (b) or the authorities described in paragraphs (1) and (2), provided that the exercise of such assigned duties or authorities is subject to the oversight of the Security Executive Agent, including such terms and conditions (including approval by the Security Executive Agent) as the Security Executive Agent determines appropriate; and

define and set standards for continuous evaluation for continued access to classified information and for eligibility to hold a sensitive position.

permits an individual to maintain his or her eligibility for access to classified information, networks, and facilities for up to 3 years after the individual’s access to classified information would otherwise lapse; and

unless otherwise directed by the Security Executive Agent, recognizes an individual’s security clearance and background investigation as current, regardless of employment status.

requirements for an individual to voluntarily remain in a continuous evaluation program validated by the Security Executive Agent even if the individual is not in a position requiring access to classified information;

appropriate safeguards for privacy;

advantages to government and industry;

the costs and savings associated with implementation;

the risks of such implementation, including security and counterintelligence risks;

an appropriate funding model; and

fairness to small companies and independent contractors.

background investigations and reinvestigations;

additional screening mechanisms, such as polygraphs, medical exams, and psychological exams;

adjudications;

other means of continuous vetting, such as continuous evaluation and user activity monitoring; and

the average per person cost for each type of security clearance.

identifies the number of individuals whose security clearances take more than 2 weeks to be reciprocally recognized after such individuals move to another part of such department or agency; and

breaks out the information described in paragraph (1) by type of clearance and the reasons for any delays.

sufficient information is provided to the private sector so that employers in the private sector can make informed decisions about hiring and retention in positions of trust; and

agencies and private sector entities that receive information under the program have the capabilities in place to safeguard personnel privacy in compliance with applicable law and policy.

In general

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent shall submit a plan to the appropriate congressional committees for the implementation of the program required under subsection (b).

Contents

The plan required under paragraph (1) shall include—