S. 4629 (116^th): America LEADS Act

for the period of the 4 calendar years beginning after the date of enactment of this Act, $300,000,000,000, which shall be in addition to any other Federal funding available for such purposes; and

for each fiscal year following the end of the period described in paragraph (1), the amount necessary to provide for increased total funding (including any other Federal funding available) for such purposes at a level that is 3 percent more than the total funding provided for such purposes for the preceding fiscal year.

Omb identification

The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall, for each of the fiscal years 2020 through 2026—

Budgets

For each of fiscal years 2020 through 2026—

Definition of federal science agency

In this subsection, the term Federal science agency has the meaning given the term in section 103 of the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (42 U.S.C. 6623).

Council

The term Council means the National Science and Technology Council.

Critical technologies

The term critical technologies means the technologies included on the most recent list under subsection (e), including any additions or deletions made by the Director in accordance with subsection (e)(2).

Director

The term Director means the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

Institution of higher education

The term institution of higher education has the meaning given the term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)).

Minority-serving institution

The term minority-serving institution means an eligible institution described in section 371(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(a)).

National laboratories

The term National Laboratories has the meaning given that term in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).

Program

The term Program means the Excellence in Critical Technologies Program established under subsection (b).

Socially and economically disadvantaged individual

The term socially and economically disadvantaged individual means any socially and economically disadvantaged individual described in the flush text following section 8(d)(3)(C) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(d)(3)(C)) and in any relevant subcontracting regulation issued under such section 8(d).

In general

The Director, acting through the Council, shall coordinate interagency activities to develop and advance critical technologies in the United States.

Designation

The initiative established under paragraph (1) shall be known as the Excellence in Critical Technologies Program.

Establish and coordinate interagency initiatives to advance critical technologies through research and development, and to encourage and enable the domestic production of such technologies, that will draw on the private sector, institutions of higher education (including minority-serving institutions), National Laboratories, Federal laboratories, and other relevant entities, as appropriate.

Advise Congress on opportunities for greater investment in United States entities involved in the domestic development, deployment, and manufacturing of critical technologies.

Collaborate with labor organizations (including labor unions), elementary and secondary schools, institutions of higher education (including minority-serving institutions), and other educational institutions and training providers on best practices for—

Establish norms for the proper development of critical technologies that ensure—

The Department of Commerce, including the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

The Department of Defense.

The Department of Energy.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The National Institutes of Health.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology.

The National Science Foundation.

Other relevant agencies designated by the Director.

Initial list

The initial list of critical technologies shall consist of the following:

Adding or deleting critical technologies

Beginning on the date that is 4 years after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 4 years thereafter, the Director—

Limit on critical technology categories

Not more than 10 critical technology categories shall be included on the list of critical technologies at any time.

Updating list of critical technologies and distribution

Upon the completion of each review under paragraph (2), the Director shall make the list of critical technologies readily available to the public, including by publishing the list in the Federal Register, even if no changes have been made to the prior list.

Establishment

Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director shall establish a private sector working group to advise the Federal Government in the development of a strategy to achieve the activities listed in subsection (c).

Membership

Convene

Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the working group established under paragraph (1) shall convene for the first time.

Meetings

After its first meeting, the working group established under paragraph (1) shall convene once every 3 months or when called upon by the Director.

Conflict of interest

The Director shall establish procedures, in accordance with Federal law, to deal with conflicts of interest.

the activities and funding levels of the Program, by agency, in the prior and current fiscal years, and plans for activities in the upcoming fiscal year;

the overall strategy to advance critical technologies through the Program and to encourage and enable the domestic production of the critical technologies;

the achievements of the Program in the prior fiscal year and any elements of the Program that need to be strengthened; and

how agency activities are being coordinated to maximize the effectiveness of Federal efforts.

Sense of congress

It is the sense of Congress that—

Implementation

In general

The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (referred to in this section as the Director), in coordination with the National Security Council, the National Economic Council, and the relevant agencies described in paragraph (2), shall establish and maintain a list of acquisition programs, technologies, manufacturing capabilities, and research areas that are critical for maintaining the national and economic security technological advantage of the United States over foreign countries of special concern.

Relevant agencies

The agencies described in this paragraph are—

To guide the recommendations of the Federal Government in any interagency determinations conducted pursuant to Federal law relating to technology protection, including relating to export licensing, deemed exports, technology transfer, and foreign direct investment.

To inform Federal Government interagency processes on promotion and protection activities involving acquisition programs and technologies that are necessary to achieve and maintain the national and economic security technology advantage of the United States, including those that are supportive of military requirements and strategies.

To inform the Federal Government’s activities to integrate acquisition, intelligence, counterintelligence and security, and law enforcement to inform requirements, acquisition, programmatic, and strategic courses of action for technology protection.

To identify vulnerabilities in supply chains in critical technologies and foundational manufacturing capabilities that are key to domestic manufacturing competitiveness and resiliency, including forming, casting, machining, joining, surface treatment, and tooling.

To inform development of research investment strategies and activities and development of innovation centers and the critical technology industrial base through the employment of financial assistance from the Federal Government through appropriate statutory authorities and programs.

To identify opportunities for alliances and partnerships in key research and development areas to achieve and maintain a national and economic security technology advantage.

To identify opportunities for the Federal Government’s acquisition programs to prompt the development, deployment, and domestic manufacturing of technologies, including creating market demand for new technologies and key manufacturing processes.

For such other purposes as the Director considers appropriate.

Initial publication

Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director shall publish the list established and maintained under subsection (a)(1).

Updates

Not later than one year after publishing the list under paragraph (1) and not less frequently than once each year thereafter, the Director shall publish the list more recently updated under subsection (c).

Justifications

Each publication under this subsection shall include a justification for the inclusion of items on the list, including specific performance and technical figures of merit.

develop and communicate United States positions regarding scientific innovation policies and the exchange of scientific information;

coordinate with allies and partner governments to ensure that the United States works cooperatively with nations in the Group of Seven and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development to leverage our combined technical expertise to lead in scientific innovation in the 21st century;

encourage partner countries—

coordinate efforts among relevant Federal agencies to build and enhance partnerships with countries to develop digital infrastructure;

lead the efforts of the Department of State, including through the Under Secretary for Management, to increase opportunities to bring specialists in innovation and critical technologies into the Department of State, including for fellowships and any other program identified by the Office;

engage with allies and partners with respect to best practices for investing in entities that promote a free, stable, open, and secure digital domain;

foster increased engagement between United States private sector entities working on critical technologies with private entities or academic institutions located in like-minded nations; and

coordinate with the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the United States Agency for International Development, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and other Federal departments and agencies to encourage American startups in artificial intelligence and data science, genomics and synthetic biology, quantum information systems, clean energy, and other frontier technologies to invest in, export to, and form research and development partnerships with reputable firms in critical technology ecosystems.

critical technologies;

scientific innovation and development policy;

international relations and diplomacy; and

the intersection of innovation and workforce and skills development.

to ensure an open flow of ideas related to innovation and technology; and

to protect the benefits of promoting innovation.

An analysis of anticompetitive behavior perpetrated by the Government of China and its state-owned enterprises in specific industries, including—

An assessment of the extent to which and how significant bribery, corruption, and extortion play into their anticompetitive behavior.

A description of the effects of the Government of China’s anticompetitive behavior on United States-owned businesses in the People’s Republic of China.

A description of the effects of the Government of China’s anticompetitive behavior on United States domestic industries and jobs.

the United States should seek areas of cooperation in the peaceful exploration of space;

the testing and use of anti-satellite technologies by the Government of China or any other country—

it is in the interests of all countries to establish and adhere to norms and treaties enshrining principles of free, peaceful, and collaborative conduct in space.

impinge on critical domestic technologies;

pose a risk to the security of the United States;

further debris-producing anti-satellite weapons testing; and

threaten human rights protections.

a strategy for pursuing bilateral and multilateral efforts to develop norms, treaties, and agreements governing responsible, collaborative, and transparent conduct in space, including—

a strategy for maintaining and enhancing efforts to return humans to the Moon and successfully carry out a crewed mission to Mars; and

an assessment of the sufficiency of current law and government structures to oversee space activities and foster continuing growth of space industry, including recommendations to achieve the same and a description of any provision of law that unnecessarily impedes appropriate collaboration with foreign countries on space programs.

Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which infrastructure investments are made.

Anti-corruption.

Rule of law.

Human rights and labor rights.

Fiscal and debt sustainability.

Social and governance safeguards.

Transparency.

Environmental and energy standards, including support for high-quality carbon-neutral energy infrastructure promoting new and renewable technologies, including wind and solar and commitments to reduce particulate pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.

assesses infrastructure around the world;

describes interests of the United States relating to infrastructure, disaggregated by regional and functional priorities; and

identifies—

to strengthen energy security;

to increase clean energy and trade;

to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and congestion from transportation sectors; and

to expand energy access in developing countries that are critical to United States interests around the world.

strengthening their energy security;

creating open, efficient, rule-based, and transparent energy markets;

improving free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading relationships; and

expanding access to affordable, reliable, clean energy and low carbon transportation.

the United States should establish bilateral, multilateral, and regional initiatives to increase energy security in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, North Africa, and the Indo-Pacific region;

the United States should explore opportunities to partner with the private sector and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, to promote universal access to reliable clean energy and less carbon intensive transportation in developing countries;

the United States should establish a partnership between the Department of Energy national laboratories and the governments of appropriate countries to provide technical assistance with respect to electrical grid development and the development and deployment of new and advanced clean energy technologies including low- and zero-emission vehicles; and

the United States should seek to encourage and support the export of United States-based efforts for the development and deployment of new and advanced clean energy technology, including low- and zero-emissions vehicles, as a central element of the development strategy of the United States.

a description of progress made toward advancing the policy described in subsection (a); and

a discussion of financing provided by entities owned or controlled by the Government of China to countries described in subsection (a), including any efforts or recommendations by the Chairman to seek greater transparency with respect to such financing.

the date that is 7 years after the date of the enactment of this Act; or

the date that is 30 days after the date on which the Secretary submits to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report stating that the Government of China is in substantial compliance with the rules and principles of the Paris Club.

to carry out the activities required under this subtitle; and

to co-finance infrastructure projects that could otherwise be included in the Belt and Road Initiative of the Government of China, if—

Telecommunications and other relevant technological fields.

Cybersecurity.

International diplomacy.

securing a 5G environment that is free, stable, open, secure, and interoperable;

opportunities for mutually beneficial engagement on 5G issues;

efforts at countering the spread of the use of information and communications technology products and services to surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as digital au­thor­i­tar­i­an­ism); and

promoting governance norms within international standard-setting bodies that align with values of the United States and like-minded allies and partners for a free and open internet.

develop and secure digital infrastructure in those countries;

protect technological assets, including data; and

advance cybersecurity and interoperability to protect against cybercrime and cyberespionage.

developing interoperable frameworks that allow for the free flow of data and information, without unnecessarily restrictive requirements for data localization and cross-border data flow, and that respect individual liberties, privacy, and human rights;

ensuring that the products and services necessary for the functioning of the digital economy are not subject to the control of an authoritarian government;

establishing standards to ensure equipment and software companies have transparent corporate ownership and are financed transparently for the purposes of procurement, investment, and contracting;

improving cybersecurity capabilities to mitigate vulnerabilities in a more complex and dynamic threat environment; and

developing best practices for financing and deploying telecommunications networks to ensure long-term solvency of market players.

leaders of the United States industry;

other relevant technology experts;

representatives from relevant United States Government agencies; and

representatives from like-minded allies and partners.

Program for fund required

The Secretary of State shall carry out a program, to be known as the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership Fund, under which the Secretary awards grants to entities to carry out digital infrastructure projects in foreign countries designed to achieve the goals described in subsection (a).

Selection of grantees

The Secretary shall award grants under the program required by this subsection to the entities that submit proposals to the Secretary for digital infrastructure projects that the Secretary determines—

Program administration

In carrying out the program required by this subsection, the Secretary shall develop—

In general

There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund.

Use of fund

Amounts deposited in the Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund shall be available to the Secretary of State to make expenditures under this subsection in such amounts as the Secretary determines appropriate.

Availability

any funding commitments from foreign partners, including each specific amount committed;

governing criteria for use of the Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund;

an account of—

additional authorities needed to enhance the effectiveness of the Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund in achieving the security goals of the United States.

In the report to Congress required under section 1261(b) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232), the President laid out a broad range of malign activities conducted by the Government of China and its agents and entities, including—

Chinese information warfare and malign influence operations are ongoing. In January 2019, the Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, stated, China will continue to use legal, political, and economic levers—such as the lure of Chinese markets—to shape the information environment. It is also capable of using cyber attacks against systems in the United States to censor or suppress viewpoints it deems politically sensitive..

In February 2020, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives that the People’s Republic of China has very active maligned foreign influence efforts in this country, with the goal of trying to shift our policy and our public opinion to be more pro-China on a variety of issues.

The People’s Republic of China’s information warfare and malign influence operations continue to adopt new tactics and evolve in sophistication. In May 2020, the Special Envoy and Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center (GEC), Lea Gabrielle, stated that there was a convergence of Russian and Chinese narratives surrounding COVID–19 and that the GEC had uncovered a new network of inauthentic Twitter accounts that it assessed was created with the intent to amplify Chinese propaganda and disinformation. In June 2020, Google reported that Chinese hackers attempted to access email accounts of the campaign staff of a presidential candidate.

Chinese information warfare and malign influence operations are a threat to the national security, democracy and the economic systems of the United States, its allies and partners. In October 2018, Vice President Mike Pence warned that Beijing is employing a whole-of-government approach, using political, economic, and military tools, as well as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit its interests in the United States..

In February 2018, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that the People’s Republic of China is taking advantage of and exploiting the open research and development environments of U.S. institutions of higher education to utilize professors, scientists and students as nontraditional collectors of information.

carry out all appropriate measures to protect our democratic institutions and processes from malign influence from the People’s Republic of China and other foreign adversaries; and

consistent with the policy specified in paragraph (1), direct the heads of the appropriate Federal departments and agencies to implement Acts of Congress to counter and deter Chinese and other foreign information warfare and malign influence operations without delay, including—

protect academic freedom at the institution;

prohibit the application of any foreign law on any campus of the institution; and

grant full managerial authority of the Confucius Institute to the institution, including full control over what is being taught, the activities carried out, the research grants that are made, and who is employed at the Confucius Institute.

In general

Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue regulations, developed through the negotiated rulemaking process under section 492 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1098a), to carry out section 117 of such Act, as amended by this section.

Issues

Regulations issued pursuant to paragraph (1), shall, at a minimum, address the following issues:

In general

The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the earlier of—

Transition

The provisions of section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f), as in effect on the day before the date of enactment of this Act, shall continue to apply until the amendments made by this section take effect under paragraph (1).

institutions of higher education of the United States should develop best practices and cooperate with efforts to report on and record the influence of the Government of China at academic institutions, including appropriate actions against government entities of the People’s Republic of China responsible for harassment;

institutions of higher education should—

all organizations on the campuses of institutions of higher education of the United States that receive substantial funding or support from Chinese diplomatic missions or other entities linked to the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of China, should—

institutions of higher education of the United States undertaking exchange programs or operating satellite campuses in the People’s Republic of China should do so with open and transparent agreements and policies to ensure the protection of academic freedom, including control over hiring and firing, freedom of scholarly research, and protection for the curriculum.

For the Scholarships in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics program under section 414(d) of the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (42 U.S.C. 1869c), notwithstanding section 414(d)(4) and in addition to funds provided by section 414(d)(4)—

For the National Science Foundation graduate research fellowship program—

For the National Science Foundation research traineeship program—

For the National Science Foundation research experience for undergraduates—

For the National Science Foundation Inclusion across the Nation of Communities of Learners of Underrepresented Discoverers in Engineering and Science—

For the National Science Foundation ADVANCE: organizational change for gender equity in STEM academic professions—

For the National Science Foundation cyber scholarships for service—

For the National Science Foundation Historically Black Colleges and Universities undergraduate program—

For the National Science Foundation Tribal Colleges and Universities program—

For the National Science Foundation Hispanic serving institutions program—

Institution of higher education

The term institution of higher education has the meaning given such term in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).

Mid-scale projects

The term mid-scale projects has the meaning given such term in section 109(b)(4) of the American Innovation and Competitiveness Act (Public Law 114–329; 130 Stat. 2988).

Minority-serving institution

The term minority-serving institution means an eligible institution described in section 371(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(a)).

In general

The Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall award grants on a competitive basis to institutions of higher education to construct, renovate, or expand research and development facilities and infrastructure to support research and development in critical technology areas.

Geographic distribution

In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director shall ensure equitable geographic distribution of funds.

Awards to minority-serving institutions

The Director shall ensure that of the amounts awarded under paragraph (1), not less than 10 percent of such amounts are awarded to minority-serving institutions.

Authorization of appropriations

There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out paragraph (1) $300,000,000 for the period of fiscal years 2021 through 2025.

In general

The Director of the National Science Foundation shall award grants on a competitive basis to eligible entities to carry out mid-scale projects.

Eligible entities

For purposes of this subsection, an eligible entity is an institution of higher education, a nonprofit organization, or a consortium of institutions of higher education or nonprofit organizations, that the Director of the National Science Foundation considers eligible to receive a grant under paragraph (1).

Authorization of appropriations

In general

For the Secretary of Defense to award grants under the Defense University Research Instrumentation Program in accordance with section 2358 of title 10, United States Code, and section 6304 of title 31, United States Code, there is authorized to be appropriated—

Availability for awards under defense established program to stimulate competitive research

Of the amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) for the Defense University Research Instrumentation Program in a fiscal year, not less than 15 percent shall be available in that fiscal year to support awards through the Defense Established Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (DEPSCoR).

Awards to minority-serving institutions

Of the amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) for the Defense University Research Instrumentation Program in a fiscal year, not less than 10 percent of such amounts shall be used for awards to minority-serving institutions.

In general

The Secretary of Defense may, on a competitive basis, award grants to at least 20 eligible entities through the Manufacturing Engineering Education Program established under section 2196(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, for the enhancement of existing programs under subparagraph (A) of such section or establishment of new programs under subparagraph (B) of such section to support industry-relevant, manufacturing-focused engineering training, with a focus on critical technology areas.

Authorization of appropriations

There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out paragraph (1)—

Supplement, not supplant

Amounts appropriated under paragraph (2) shall supplement and not supplant any amounts otherwise appropriated to carry out the Manufacturing Engineering Education Program.

In general

To award grants under section 3(a) of the Scientific and Advanced-Technology Act of 1992 (42 U.S.C. 1862i(a)) for training programs and education programs in manufacturing related to the critical technology areas, there is authorized to be appropriated—

Supplement, not supplant

Amounts appropriated under paragraph (1) shall supplement and not supplant any amounts otherwise appropriated to award grants under section 3(a) of the Scientific and Advanced-Technology Act of 1992 (42 U.S.C. 1862i(a)).

A local educational agency (as defined in section 8101 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801)), an area career and technical education school (as defined in section 3 of the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act of 2006 (20 U.S.C. 2302)), an educational service agency (as defined in section 8101 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801)), or a postsecondary educational institution.

An industry or business, consisting of an employer, a group of employers, a trade association, a professional association, an apprenticeship program, or an entity that sponsors an apprenticeship program.

A State workforce development board established under section 101 of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (29 U.S.C. 3111) or a local workforce development board established under section 107 of such Act (29 U.S.C. 3122), subject to section 107(c)(4)(B)(i) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 3122(c)(4)(B)(i)).

To the maximum extent practicable, as determined by the consortium, one or more of the following:

not less than 50 percent of the funds appropriated under subsection (e) shall be awarded to States in accordance with the award information described in the Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration Training and Employment Guidance Letter No. 17–18 issued on May 3, 2019; and

the funds remaining under subsection (e) after the application of paragraph (1) shall be used for creating or expanding opportunities in apprenticeship programs, including opportunities in pre-apprenticeship programs and youth apprenticeship programs, and related activities, including—

Perkins cte definitions

The terms career and technical education, dual or concurrent enrollment program, and work-based learning have the meanings given the terms in section 3 of the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act of 2006 (20 U.S.C. 2302).

Eligible entity

The term eligible entity—

Eligible institution

The term eligible institution means a public institution of higher education (as defined in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)) at which the highest degree that is predominantly awarded to students is an associate degree, including a 2-year Tribal College or University (as defined in section 316 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c)).

In-demand industry sector or occupation

The term in-demand industry sector or occupation has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (29 U.S.C. 3102).

In general

From amounts appropriated under subsection (h) and not reserved under subsection (f), the Secretary of Labor, in collaboration with the Secretary of Education (acting through the Office of Career, Technical, and Adult Education) shall award, on a competitive basis, grants, contracts, or cooperative agreements, in accordance with section 169(b)(5) of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (29 U.S.C. 3224(b)(5)), to eligible entities to assist such eligible entities in—

Award amounts

The total amount of funds awarded under this section to an eligible entity shall not exceed—

Award period

A grant, contract, or cooperative agreement awarded under this section shall be for a period of not more than 4 years, except that the Secretary of Labor may extend such a grant, contract, or agreement for an additional 2-year period.

Equitable distribution

In awarding grants under this section, the Secretary of Labor shall ensure, to the extent practicable, the equitable distribution of grants, based on—

serve such individuals who are—

serve such individuals from each major racial and ethnic group or gender with lower-than-average educational attainment in the State or employment in the in-demand industry sector or occupation that such award will support; or

serve areas with high unemployment rates or high levels of poverty, including rural areas.

Each entity (and the roles and responsibilities of each entity) with which the eligible entity will partner to carry out activities under this section, which shall include, at a minimum—

The programs that will be supported with such award, including a description of—

The extent to which the eligible entity can leverage additional resources, and demonstration of the future sustainability of each such program.

How each such program and the activities carried out with funds under this section will include evidence-based practices, including a description of such practices.

The student populations that will be served by the eligible entity, including—

Assurances the eligible entity will participate in and comply with third-party evaluations described in subsection (f)(3).

In general

An eligible entity receiving a grant, contract, or cooperative agreement under this section shall use funds made available under such grant, contract, or cooperative agreement to establish and scale career training programs, including career and technical education programs, and career pathways and supports for students participating in such programs.

Student support and emergency services

Not less than 15 percent of funds made available to an eligible entity under this section shall be used to carry out student support services, which may include the following:

Additional required program activities

The funds awarded to an eligible entity under this section that remain after carrying out paragraph (2) shall be used to—

the administration of the program under this section, including providing technical assistance to eligible entities;

targeted outreach to eligible institutions serving a high number or high percentage of low-income populations, and rural-serving eligible institutions, to provide guidance and assistance in the grant application process under this section; and

a rigorous, third-party evaluation that uses experimental or quasi-experimental design or other research methodologies that allow for the strongest possible causal inferences to determine whether each eligible entity carrying out a program supported under this section has met the goals of such program as described in the application submitted by eligible entity, including through a national assessment of all such programs at the conclusion of each 4-year grant period.

Reports

Each eligible entity receiving funds under this section shall prepare and submit a report to the Secretary of Labor annually that includes—

Dissemination

Each eligible entity receiving funds under this section shall—

the term covered period means the period beginning on the date on which an individual is appointed to a covered position and ending on the date that is 5 years after the date on which the individual separates from that covered position; and

the term covered position means—

an assessment of the current strategy of, and resources used by, the Government of China to influence Chinese diaspora communities, including a review of—

a description of the impacts that the influence and intimidation efforts referred to in paragraph (1) have had on Chinese diaspora communities;

the identification of Chinese government officials involved in directing and executing the activities referred to in paragraph (1);

a list of the nations in which Chinese diaspora communities have been targeted;

a description of the tactics and resources used by the Government of China in each nation referred to in paragraph (4); and

a review of the efforts made by nations to counteract the influence of the Government of China on Chinese diaspora communities, including an assessment of the efficacy of such efforts.

any authorities or resources required to carry out the strategy; and

the identification of opportunities to cooperate with other nations to counteract such influence operations.

the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;

the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

international human rights;

democracy;

good governance;

labor;

the environment; and

anti-corruption.

the United States benefits greatly from its ties to allies and partners, without which the United States would be less secure and less prosperous;

any fissures in the United States alliance relationships and partnerships only benefit United States adversaries;

the Governments of the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand are important allies in tackling global challenges and have pledged significant support for efforts of shared interest;

strengthening and deepening partnerships with the nations of Southeast Asia, including Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia, as well as with the region’s emerging ASEAN-centered architecture, is essential to further our shared interests;

the United States should make concrete efforts to cultivate and deepen ties with allies and partners through new and ongoing dialogue and exchanges with counterparts; and

the United States will work with allies to prioritize promoting human rights and labor rights throughout the region.

to deepen multilateral diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, including through diplomatic engagement, regional development, energy security, scientific and health partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, missile defense, intelligence-sharing, space, cyber, and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;

to uphold our multilateral and bilateral treaty obligations, including—

to strengthen and deepen our bilateral and regional partnerships, including with ASEAN and New Zealand;

to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia to promote human rights bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora and pacts; and

to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with regional partners, such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India.

The Trump Administration has abdicated historic United States leadership at the United Nations and in other international and regional organizations, creating a vacuum that the Government of China is filling.

The United States, through enforcement of a statutory cap on contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations, has accrued $1,000,000,000 in arrears since fiscal year 2017, leading to funding disruptions to United Nations peacekeeping missions.

The Administration withdrew the United States from the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 and is currently withholding assessed funds for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, which has authorized and led investigations uncovering grave human rights abuses in Syria, Venezuela, Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, among other places.

The United States formally submitted a notice of withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement in 2019, a landmark international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and address the impacts of climate change.

In the midst of a deadly global pandemic, President Trump announced on May 29, 2020, that the United States would terminate its relationship with the World Health Organization, and on July 6, 2020, the Administration submitted its formal notice of withdrawal from the World Health Organization. The World Health Organization is playing a key role in the global pandemic response, including by developing technical guidance, providing personal protective equipment and testing kits to low-resource countries, and supporting efforts to identify effective treatments and a vaccine.

The Administration has taken these decisions at the same time the Government of China is increasing its activities at the United Nations and in international and regional organizations in order to pursue its national interests and exploit the United States leadership vacuum.

Chinese nationals currently head four of the United Nations specialized agencies, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). A United States national holds the top leadership position in UNICEF and the World Bank.

The Government of China has sought to use its growing influence to promote a view of international human rights contrary to universal values and elevates the power of the Chinese Communist Party and the state over the rights of the individual, gives primacy to economic and social matters over civil and political rights, and seeks to mute criticism of individual countries’ human rights records, particularly its own.

The Government of China, at every opportunity, will fill the leadership void left by the United States if the United States continues to decrease its engagement with and in regional institutions, international organizations, and with the United Nations, by withdrawing from key United Nations bodies, unilaterally cutting funding to core United Nations programs and agencies, or abrogating its obligations under multilateral treaties or agreements.

Fully engage with United Nations bodies and agencies to counter efforts by Chinese diplomats to push concepts, proposals, and programs that undermine United States national and allied interests and values.

Pay United States peacekeeping assessments at the assessed rate negotiated by United States diplomats at the United Nations and pay back outstanding arrears.

Reengage with the United Nations Human Rights Council, including by running for a seat on the Council in future elections held by the United Nations General Assembly.

Refrain from withholding budget funds from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Rescind the United States notice of withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement or if this Act is enacted after November 4, 2020, rejoin as a party to the Paris Climate Agreement.

Rescind the United States notice of withdrawal from the World Health Organization, release assessed and voluntary funding withheld from the WHO, and engage with the WHO on efforts to combat COVID–19 and other public health threats.

Seek to support United States candidates for positions in United Nations bodies and to ensure that such efforts are resourced and staffed, as well as to encourage and support like-minded governments to put forth their own nominees for positions in United Nations bodies.

Engage with regional organizations, including NATO, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organization of American States (OAS) to counter efforts by Chinese diplomatic concepts, proposals, and programs that undermine United States national and allied interests and values.

Congress has provided the President with a broad range of tough authorities to impose sanctions to address malign behavior by the Government of China and individuals and entities in the People’s Republic of China, including individuals and entities engaging in—

Congress has in many cases mandated imposition of sanctions and other measures with respect to individuals and entities identified as responsible for such behavior.

In general

The President shall use the full range of authorities available to the President, including the authorities described in paragraph (2) to impose sanctions and other measures to combat malign behavior by the Government of China, entities owned or controlled by that Government, and other Chinese individuals and entities responsible for such behavior.

Authorities described

The authorities described in this paragraph include the following:

Trade and investment issues and enforcement.

Establishing and promulgating international infrastructure standards.

The erosion of democracy in Hong Kong.

Human rights concerns in Xinjiang, Tibet, and other areas in the People's Republic of China.

The security of 5G telecommunications.

Anti-competitive behavior.

Coercive and indentured international finance and conditional provision of foreign assistance.

International influence campaigns.

Environmental standards.

Coordination with like-minded regional partners, including the Republic of Korea and Australia.

April 10, 2019, marks the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–8).

Since 1949, the close relationship between the United States and Taiwan has been of enormous benefit to both parties and to the Indo-Pacific region as a whole.

The military balance of power across the Taiwan Strait continues to shift in favor of the People’s Republic of China, which is currently engaged in a comprehensive military modernization campaign to enhance the power-projection capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army and its ability to conduct joint operations.

Taiwan and its diplomatic partners continue to face sustained pressure and coercion from the Government of China to isolate Taiwan from the international community, including the World Health Organization.

In the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135), which became law on March 16, 2018, Congress observed that the self-imposed restrictions that the United States maintains on relations with Taiwan have negative consequences for the United States-Taiwan relationship.

Taiwan is a vital part of the United States Indo-Pacific strategy;

the security of Taiwan and its democracy are key elements for the continued peace and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and a vital national security interest of the United States;

the United States Government—

Taiwan’s implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy is supported by the United States Government;

Taiwan must increase its defense spending in order to fully resource its defense strategy; and

the United States should conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and air defense capabilities, into its military forces.

to advocate for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the United Nations, the World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other international bodies as appropriate;

to seek meaningful cooperation between the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners; and

that the United States should actively work with other member countries of international bodies and organizations to advocate for Taiwan’s participation.

recurring outbreaks of emerging and reemerging zoonotic diseases, including Ebola virus disease, severe acute respiratory syndrome, and avian influenza, pose an increasing threat to lives and livelihood, demonstrating the need to engage in a One Health approach, which recognizes the interconnection between people, animals, plants, and their shared environment; and

transparency, coordination, and collaboration with stakeholders and partners is key to containment of emerging zoonotic diseases.

the investments that reduce most effectively the risk of the transmission of viruses that pose the greatest threat to Americans and United States national security; and

building networks and strengthening capacity in labs, institutions of higher education, and other institutions to identify and publicly report on emerging zoonotic diseases.

In general

Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State and the Department of Commerce for fiscal year 2021, not more than $10,000,000, respectively, shall be available to carry out the purposes of this section.

Termination

The availability of funds in paragraph (1) shall expire on December 31, 2025.

the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

The implications of COVID–19 on the Government of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with respect to any agreements made with BRI contracted countries on debt restructuring, debt sustainability, or debt forgiveness.

The failure of the BRI of the People’s Republic of China to meet international standards with respect to the following:

The links between the BRI and the following:

Whether any projects being carried out under the BRI present the potential for United States engagement, with the support of the Asian Development Bank, to leverage existing contracts into sustainable infrastructure investments.

Whether any such projects meet the international standards described in paragraph (2).

In the case of projects described in paragraph (4) that fail to meet the international standards described in paragraph (2), whether such failures could be mitigated through support by the United States.

Whether the BRI is achieving the objectives of the Government of China.

How the BRI is managed and controlled.

How the BRI is evolving over time.

the Fund does not provide more than approximately 15 percent of the resources of the Fund to any one country; and

each country that receives amounts from the Fund submit to the governing body of the Fund an investment plan that—

In general

The Secretary of the Treasury shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to ensure that support from the Fund is used exclusively to support the deployment of clean energy technologies in developing countries (including, where appropriate, through the provision of technical support or support for policy or institutional reforms) in a manner that achieves substantial additional reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.

Definitions

In this subsection:

the purpose of and progress on each project supported by the Fund; and

how each such project furthers the investment plan described in subsection (b)(2) of each country in which the project is implemented.

the GCF does not provide more than approximately 15 percent of the resources of the Fund to any one country;

each country that receives amounts from the GCF submit to the governing body of the Fund an investment plan that—

in the case of a country that is not classified by the World Bank as having a low-income economy, provides for not less than 15 percent of the total cost of the plan to be contributed from the public funds of the country.

the purpose of and progress on each project supported by the Fund; and

how each such project furthers the investment plan described in subsection (b)(2) of each country in which the project is implemented.

by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and

by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph:

by striking subsections (a) and (b); and

by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively.

hydrofluorocarbons are highly potent greenhouse gases;

the United States must work cooperatively with the international community to significantly reduce hydrofluorocarbons in commerce;

the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, adopted in October 2016 at the 28th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol in Kigali, Rwanda, provides the legal framework for global cooperation on reducing hydrofluorocarbons in global commerce;

the United States is a leader in chemical and technological innovation that is at the forefront of developing safer chemical alternatives to hydrofluorocarbons and the technologies to use those new replacement chemicals;

industrial sectors in other countries, such as the People’s Republic of China, are working quickly to catch up to the United States in developing and marketing chemical and technological alternatives that support the phasedown of hydrofluorocarbons in global commerce in accordance with the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol; and

United States chemical and refrigeration industries are disadvantaged in the global marketplace because the United States has not ratified the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.

to ratify the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol; and

to enact legislation providing sufficient authorities for the United States to comply with the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.

withdraw or otherwise reduce the overall presence, including the rotational presence, of United States Armed Forces personnel and civilian employees of the Department of Defense in Japan and the Republic of Korea;

close or change the status of any base or other facility of the United States Armed Forces located in Japan or the Republic of Korea; or

withdraw or otherwise reduce the overall presence of United States Armed Forces assets in Japan or the Republic of Korea.

the host government transmits to the United States Government a written request for such a withdrawal or other reduction; or

Authorization of appropriations

There is authorized to be appropriated $200,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2021 and 2022 for the creation of a pilot program for foreign military financing compacts.

Assistance

The Secretary of State is authorized to create a pilot program, for a duration of two years, with an assessment for any additional or permanent programming, to provide assistance under this section for each country that enters into an FMF Challenge Compact with the United States pursuant to paragraph (7) to support policies and programs that advance the progress of the country in achieving lasting security and civilian-military governance through respect for human rights, good governance (including transparency and free and fair elections), and cooperation with United States and international counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking, and counter-crime efforts and programs.

Form of assistance

Assistance under this subsection may be provided in the form of grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, or no-interest loans to the government of an eligible country described in paragraph (5).

Application

The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and recommend procedures for considering solicited and unsolicited proposals for compacts under this pilot program.

Eligible countries

A country shall be a candidate country for purposes of eligibility for assistance for fiscal year 2021 and 2022 if—

Identification of eligible countries

Not later than 90 days prior to the date on which the Secretary of State determines eligible countries for an FMF Challenge Compact, the Secretary—

FMF Challenge Compact

Congressional consultation prior to compact negotiations

Not later than 15 days before commencing negotiations of a Compact with an eligible country, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees with respect to the proposed Compact negotiation and shall identify the objectives and mechanisms to be used for the negotiation of the Compact.

Assessment of pilot program and recommendations

Not later than 90 days after the conclusion of the pilot program, the Secretary of State shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional committees with respect to the pilot program, assess the success and utility of the pilot program established under this subsection in meeting objectives, and make a recommendation for continuing on a pilot or permanent basis with a further foreign military financing compact program.

an arms control dialogue with the Government of China, coordinated with United States allies and shaped by a coherent Indo-Pacific strategy, is in the national security interests of the United States; and

the United States Government should formulate a strategy to engage the Government of China on relevant bilateral issues that lays the groundwork for bringing the People’s Republic of China into an arms control framework, including—

areas of potential dialogue between the Governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China, including on nuclear, ballistic, and cruise missiles, conventional forces, space, and cyberspace issues, as well as other new strategic domains, which could reduce the likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the Indo-Pacific;

how the United States Government can foster increased interest on the part of the Government of China in arms control;

identifying strategic military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China that the United States Government is most concerned about and how limiting these capabilities may benefit United States and allied security interests;

opportunities for multilateral arms control in the Indo-Pacific region;

mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military escalation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China; and

opportunities and methods to create strategic transparency between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.

a concrete plan for arms control talks that includes both the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation;

if a trilateral arms control dialogue does not arise, what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for ensuring United States security from Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons;

efforts at engaging the People’s Republic of China to join arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis; and

the interest level of the Government of China in joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis.

The strategy behind the decision to extend or not extend New START.

If New START were allowed to expire, an assessment of whether such an expiration is in the national security interests of the United States, including the specific reasons for such conclusion.

An examination of the effects of the expiration of New START on—

An assessment of how the Government of the Russian Federation will modify its nuclear forces in an unconstrained environment and how the United States Government will respond if the Government of the Russian Federation expands its arsenal.

An assessment of how the United States Government will need to alter intelligence capabilities and spending to regain, if possible, the knowledge of the Russian Federation’s arsenal that is currently provided by the inspection and verification mechanisms inherent to New START.

condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of force to impede freedom of operations in international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region;

urges the Government of China to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, which is contrary to freedom of overflight in international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;

reaffirms that the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal’s decision is final and legally binding on both parties and that the People’s Republic of China’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are unlawful;

condemns the People’s Republic of China for failing to abide by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling, despite Chinese obligations as a state party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea;

rejects the People’s Republic of China’s unlawful maritime claim within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;

rejects the People’s Republic of China’s claim to waters beyond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands; and

rejects the People’s Republic of China’s unlawful territorial or maritime claim to the James shoal.

reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding United States policy regarding Article V of the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and reaffirm its position that Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;

oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, that belong to all nations, and oppose the militarization of new and reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;

urge all parties to refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed claims;

ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force;

call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in accordance with international law;

uphold the principle that territorial and maritime claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must be derived from land features and otherwise comport with international law;

oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the region;

support efforts by ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China to develop an effective Code of Conduct, including the early harvest of agreed-upon elements in the Code of Conduct that can be implemented immediately;

reaffirm that an existing body of international rules and guidelines, including the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other countries, including the People’s Republic of China;

support the development of regional institutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the region and reinforce the role of international law;

encourage the deepening of partnerships with other countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States Government to explore the development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms for a common operating picture in the South China Sea that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities;

oppose actions by any country to prevent any other country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have no support in international law; and

assure the continuity of operations by the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in international waters and airspace in accordance with established principles and practices of international law.

In general

The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, is authorized to provide assistance, for the purpose of increasing maritime security and domain awareness for countries in the Indo-Pacific region—

Designation of assistance

Assistance provided by the Secretary of State under this section shall be known as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (in this section referred to as the Initiative).

Retaining unhindered access to and use of international waterways in the Indo-Pacific region that are critical to ensuring the security and free flow of commerce and achieving United States national security objectives.

Improving maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific region.

Countering piracy in the Indo-Pacific region.

Disrupting illicit maritime trafficking activities and other forms of maritime trafficking activity in the Indo-Pacific that directly benefit organizations that have been determined to be a security threat to the United States.

Enhancing the maritime capabilities of a country or regional organization to respond to emerging threats to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region.

In general

In carrying out the purpose of the Initiative—

Types of assistance and training