S. 3488 (117^th): Defending Ukraine Sovereignty Act of 2022

A plan to meet the most critical capability gaps and capacity shortfalls of the armed forces of Ukraine.

A plan for United States cooperation with allies and partners to provide immediate assistance to the armed forces of Ukraine.

A plan to prioritize the delivery of excess defense articles to Ukraine in accordance with section 101.

A plan to transfer to Ukraine defense articles previously allocated for operations in Afghanistan that are available for transfer, as appropriate.

the provision of security assistance to Ukraine is one of the most efficient and effective mechanisms for supporting Ukraine and ensuring that it can defend against aggression by the Russian Federation;

in light of the military build-up by the Government of the Russian Federation, the United States, working with allies and partners, should work to expedite the provision of defense articles and other security assistance to Ukraine and prioritize and facilitate assistance to respond to the most urgent defense needs of the armed forces of Ukraine; and

the United States should ensure adequate planning for maintenance for any equipment provided to Ukraine.

A detailed description of the assistance or support to be provided, including—

A description of such other matters as the Secretary considers appropriate.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a critical component of United States security assistance that facilitates training of international forces and strengthens cooperation and ties between the United States and foreign countries;

it is in the national interest of the United States to further strengthen the armed forces of Ukraine, particularly to enhance their defensive capability and improve interoperability for joint operations; and

the Government of Ukraine should fully utilize the United States IMET program, encourage eligible officers and civilian leaders to participate in the training, and promote successful graduates to positions of prominence in the armed forces of Ukraine.

Training of future leaders.

Establishing a rapport between the United States Armed Forces and the armed forces of Ukraine to build partnerships for the future.

Enhancement of interoperability and capabilities for joint operations.

Focusing on professional military education, civilian control of the military, and human rights.

Fostering a better understanding of the United States.

A detailed description of the assistance or support to be provided, including—

A description of such other matters as the Secretary considers appropriate.

A clear plan, developed in close consultation with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the armed forces of Ukraine, for how the IMET program will be used by the United States Government and the Government of Ukraine to propel program graduates to positions of prominence in support of the reform efforts of the armed forces of Ukraine in line with NATO standards.

An assessment of the education and training requirements of the armed forces of Ukraine and clear recommendations for how IMET graduates should be assigned by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense upon completion of education or training.

An accounting of the current combat requirements of the armed forces of Ukraine and an assessment of the viability of alternative mobile training teams, distributed learning, and other flexible solutions to reach such students.

An identification of opportunities to influence the next generation of leaders through attendance at United States staff and war colleges, junior leader development programs, and technical schools.

to prioritize assisting Ukraine to detect and combat disinformation from the Russian Federation and its proxies; and

to assist the Government of Ukraine in developing new defense strategies and technologies.

In general

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for countering and combating disinformation by the Russian Federation and supporting free and independent media in Ukraine that includes—

Form

The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty continues to fulfill its mission of providing reliable, uncensored, and accessible news and reporting in Ukraine and other countries where media freedom is restricted;

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is one of the most critical sources of unrestricted, independent news and reporting for audiences on the periphery of the Russian Federation;

the Government of the Russian Federation has engaged in systematic targeting of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporters inside the Russian Federation, which has negatively impacted the organization’s ability to provide timely, reliable, and accurate news from inside the country; and

despite pressure from the Government of the Russian Federation, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s audience continues to grow inside the Russian Federation and surrounding countries.

evaluate where Russian disinformation is most deeply pervasive in the Eurasia region;

develop strategies to better communicate with predominately Russian-speaking regions;

build on efforts to increase capacity and programming to counter disinformation in real time;

expand Russian language investigative journalism;

improve the technical capacity of the Ukraine bureau; and

continue efforts to increase digital news services.

recommendations of locations to open new bureaus to help reach new audiences in the broader Eurasia region;

an assessment of current staffing and anticipated staffing needs in order to effectively reach audiences in the broader Eurasia region; and

an assessment of the impact of the Government of the Russian Federation closing down Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty within the Russian Federation.

to support multilateral, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental efforts to improve Ukraine’s cybersecurity capacity, including addressing legislative and regulatory gaps in Ukraine’s cybersecurity policies, improving cybersecurity sector governance, and expanding collaboration among relevant stakeholders in both the public and private sectors;

to work with the Government of Ukraine to strengthen cybersecurity technical capacity within critical infrastructure sectors and improve the overall cybersecurity workforce by strengthening cybersecurity-related academic and training programs and exchanges;

to work closely with the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, and the National Cyber Security Centre of the United Kingdom to bolster Ukraine’s cyber defense capabilities; and

to strengthen the ability of the Government of Ukraine to detect, investigate, disrupt, and deter cyberattacks and to develop cybersecurity incident response teams.

an assessment of the priorities and objectives of the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation with respect to Ukraine;

a detailed description of the steps taken by any intelligence or security services of the Russian Federation to undermine the stability of Ukraine or the Government of Ukraine;

a complete list of the branches of the intelligence or security services of the Russian Federation that have engaged in any influence efforts or campaigns to undermine the stability of Ukraine or the Government of Ukraine;

an assessment of—

any plans by the United States to provide additional support to the Government of Ukraine to prevent internal destabilization efforts, including through intelligence sharing and support for reforms and anti-corruption efforts.

the United States should work closely with NATO allies, particularly those that share a border with the Russian Federation, on any matters related to European security; and

the United States Mission to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (commonly referred to as the OSCE) should—

an assessment of whether the Government of the Russian Federation has sufficiently de-escalated regional tensions, including through a significant withdrawal of troops from the border of Ukraine, to merit further discussion;

an assessment of the objectives of the Government of the Russian Federation related to European security;

a plan to reduce tensions between the Russian Federation and Eastern European allies, taking into account the perspectives of a wide cross section of European allies of the United States; and

a plan for including Eastern European NATO allies, specifically those that share a border with the Russian Federation, in any conversations on European security.

supporting and bolstering the security of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is in the national security interests of the United States;

the Baltic states are critical in countering aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation and maintaining the collective security of the NATO alliance;

the United States should continue to support and foster a security partnership with the Baltic states that aims to meet their security needs and provides additional capabilities and tools to help defend against aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation in the region;

the United States should encourage the initiative undertaken by the Baltic states to advance the Three Seas Initiative to strengthen transport, energy, and digital infrastructures among eastern Europe countries;

there are mutually beneficial opportunities for increased investment and economic expansion between the United States and the Baltic states; and

improved economic ties between the United States and the Baltic states will lead to a strengthened strategic partnership.

In general

The Secretary of State shall establish an initiative to deepen and foster security and economic ties with the Baltic states.

Purpose and objectives

The initiative established under paragraph (1) shall have the following goals and objectives:

Activities

The initiative established under paragraph (1) shall—

an identification of significant senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, as determined by their closeness to Vladimir Putin;

the estimated net worth and known sources of income of the individuals identified under paragraph (1), Vladimir Putin, and the family members of such individuals and Vladimir Putin (including spouses, children, parents, and siblings), including assets, investments, bank accounts, business interests, held in and outside of the Russian Federation, and relevant beneficial ownership information;

an estimate of the total annual income and personal expenditures of Vladimir Putin and his family members for calendar years 2017 through 2021; and

all known details about the financial practices and transparency, or lack thereof, of Vladimir Putin and the individuals identified under paragraph (1).

In general

The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Public availability

The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) shall be made available on a publicly accessible internet website.

the appropriate congressional committees;

the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

A plan to bolster support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders, including plans for high-level representation and robust participation in Ukraine’s Crimea Platform.

A plan to highlight human rights abuses by the Government of the Russian Federation in Ukrainian territory, which shall include mechanisms to draw attention to persecuted minorities and political prisoners in Crimea and the Donbas.

An assessment of humanitarian assistance needs for those affected or displaced by the war in Donbas.

A plan to support democracy and the rule of law in Ukraine, which shall include efforts to build on progress made on the establishment of anti-corruption institutions, land reform, local governance, and digitalization.

the Government of the Russian Federation, including through any of its proxies, is engaged in or knowingly supporting a significant escalation in hostilities or hostile action in or against Ukraine, compared to the level of hostilities or hostile action in or against Ukraine prior to December 1, 2021; and

if so, whether such escalation has the aim or effect of undermining, overthrowing, or dismantling the Government of Ukraine, occupying the territory of Ukraine, or interfering with the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine.

not later than 15 days after the date of the enactment of this Act;

after the first determination under paragraph (1), every 90 days (or more frequently as warranted) during the one-year period beginning on such date of enactment; and

after the end of that one-year period, every 120 days.

The President of the Russian Federation.

The Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

The Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.

The Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of the Russian Federation.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation.

The Commander of the Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the Russian Federation.

The Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation.

The Commander of the Special Operations Forces of the Russian Federation.

The Commander of Logistical Support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

List required

Not later than 30 days after making an affirmative determination under section 302 and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of foreign persons that the President determines—

Imposition of sanctions

Upon the submission of each list required by paragraph (1), the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to each foreign person on the list.

In general

Upon making an affirmative determination under section 302 and not later than 30 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with respect to 3 or more of the following financial institutions:

Subsidiaries and successor entities

The President may impose the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with respect to any subsidiary of, or successor entity to, a financial institution specified in paragraph (1).

List required

Not later than 30 days after making an affirmative determination under section 302, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of foreign persons that the President determines—

Imposition of sanctions

Upon the submission of each list required by paragraph (1), the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with respect to each foreign person identified on the list.

describes the status of efforts to ensure that the termination of the provision of specialized financial messaging services to, and the enabling and facilitation of access to such services for, any financial institution with respect to which sanctions are imposed under section 304; and

identifies any other provider of specialized financial messaging services that continues to provide messaging services to, or enables or facilitates access to such services for, any such financial institution.

In general

Not later than 60 days after making an affirmative determination under section 302, the President shall identify and impose the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to foreign persons that the President determines engage in transactions involving the debt—

Applicability

Sanctions imposed under paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to debt of an entity described in subparagraph (A) of that paragraph that is issued after the date that is 90 days after the President makes an affirmative determination under section 302.

submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of foreign persons that the President determines are engaged in transactions described in subsection (a); and

impose the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to each such person.

the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is a tool of malign influence of the Russian Federation and if it becomes operational, it will embolden the Russian Federation to further pressure and destabilize Ukraine; and

the United States should consider all available and appropriate measures to prevent the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from becoming operational, including through sanctions with respect to entities and individuals responsible for planning, constructing, or operating the pipeline, and through diplomatic efforts.

Oil and gas extraction and production.

Coal extraction, mining, and production.

Minerals extraction and processing.

Any other sector or industry with respect to which the President determines the imposition of sanctions is in the United States national security interest.

submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of the persons identified under subsection (a); and

impose the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to each such person.

Exception for intelligence activities

This title shall not apply with respect to activities subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

Exception for compliance with international obligations and law enforcement activities

Sanctions under this title shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary—

determines that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and

submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a notification of the waiver and the reasons for the waiver.